The comedy of errors, resulting from incompetence and worse, that is the Israel government, never seems to end.

The one, and only, police department in Israel falls under the purview of the Ministry of National Security.  The Israel Police department is commanded by a Police Commissioner.  Israel is subdivided into police districts, based on geography.  Each district is commanded by a District Commander, who is responsible to the Police Commissioner.

Recently, a political protest was held in Jerusalem.  Some of those who participated in the protest set rubber tires ablaze near the Prime Minister’s official residence and blocked both a major highway and a light-rail public transportation line.

Following the protest, the National Security Minister verbally reprimanded the Jerusalem District police commander for the failure of Jerusalem police to maintain control over the protest.  In response, the Police Commissioner issued a statement which reads in relevant part, “The Commissioner backs the Jerusalem District . . . for standing firm and exercising discretion in dealing with the protest and the subsequent breach of order.”

There are at least two glaring problems with these events.  The first is that of a failure to utilize the chain-of-command.  The National Security Minister, who was appointed by his political party, a party which was elected by Israeli voters, is responsible for establishing policy for government agencies, such as the Israel Police Department, which, organizationally, are within the Ministry of National Security.  Thus, the National Security Minister should have reprimanded the Police Commissioner, not the Jerusalem District police commander.  This was a “rookie” ministerial mistake, although not a serious one.

The second, and by far the most serious, problem is that of the response which was published by the Police Commissioner, who said that he “backs,” that is supports, the actions for which the Jerusalem District [police commander] had just been reprimanded.

The Police Commissioner’s insubordinate public statement is nothing short of a refusal by the Police Commissioner, an appointed civil servant, albeit a powerful one, to acknowledge and accept the authority of the elected, political elements of government.

In a democracy, those who wield the power of the sword (e.g., police and military) must always submit to the authority and control of the political officers of government.  If they do not, what will exist is a totalitarian state, not a democracy.

​“It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government[,] except [for] all the others that have been tried.”  Winston Churchill.
 
What Mr. Churchill appears to have meant is that although imperfect, “democracy” is the best form of government that man has so far been able to devise.  This understanding, however, leads naturally to the question: What is “democracy”?
 
One source defines “democracy” as “literally, rule by the people.  The term is derived from the Greek dēmokratia, which was coined from dēmos (‘people’) and kratos (‘rule’) in the middle of the 5th century BCE to denote the political systems then existing in some Greek city-states, notably Athens.”  Britannica.com [https://www.britannica.com/topic/democracy]
 
Thus, from its definition, we see that the concept of “democracy,” as understood in Western culture, is not a Jewish concept.
 
In a nutshell, “democracy” means majority rule.
 
But why should the majority rule?  After all, there are many historical examples of times when majorities have chosen unwisely or have trampled the human and civil rights of minorities.
 
James Madison, a Founding Father and fourth President of the United States recognized, because of his role in drafting the U.S. Constitution, the dangers inherent in democracy.  Prior to America’s ratification of its Constitution, Madison warned about the dangers inherent in the concept of democracy: “instability, injustice, and confusion . . . have in truth been the mortal disease under which popular [democratic] governments everywhere [have] perished. . . .”  James Madison, Federalist No.10.
 
As a way to minimize the inherent dangers posed by democracy, while still retaining its virtue of governing in accordance with the will of a majority of its people, Madison proposed a republican form of government, stating that, “we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behaviour.”  Federalist No. 39.
 
In other words, a “republic” is a form of diffused or indirect democracy.
 
The Founders of America, from the Pilgrims to the signers of the Declaration of Independence, to those who ratified the U.S. Constitution, and a majority of its citizens, at least through the first century or so of that country’s existence, were, as a group, keenly aware of the existence of a Creator.  The Pilgrims regarded themselves as the Hebrews of that era, considered their voyage across the Atlantic to be analogous to the Jews’ journey through the Wilderness, and considered America to be their Promised Land.
 
In drafting and ratifying the U.S. Constitution, America’s Founders endeavored to establish a government and laws that were modeled on the framework, as they understood it, which is set forth in Tanakh.  Thus, in keeping with the pasuk “the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, [and] the Lord is our king,” Yesha’yahu 33:22, it’s not surprising that the U.S. Constitution divides the powers of government into three branches, legislative, executive, and judicial, much like Tanakh describes.
 
In order to guard against the dangers of majority rule, that is, the dangers of democracy, the U.S. Constitution is a document which is quite anti-democratic in many respects: It seeks to limit the powers of government by, among other things, dividing those powers into three co-equal branches; enumerating, and thereby limiting, legislative powers; and articulating certain actions which government may not take (Bill of Rights).  However, notwithstanding these constitutional restraints, the second President of the United States famously said, “Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people.  It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.”  John Adams.
 
Medinat Yisra’el (the State of Israel) is currently considering certain reforms to its judicial system.  Broadly speaking, the proposed reforms fall into three categories: Judicial Review, Appointment of Judges, and the Scope of the Attorney General’s Authority.  Not surprisingly, some of the proposed reforms are being vigorously and vocally opposed by certain persons, both inside and outside of the Israel government.
 
The United States, a non-Jewish country, was founded on Jewish principles and ideals.  Prior to largely abandoning most of those principles and ideals, the United States was, arguably, the most successful democracy in history.  Medinat Yisra’el is a self-proclaimed democracy and Jewish state, albeit one that was neither founded, nor currently based, on Torah principles.  Notwithstanding the vastly different backgrounds of these two countries, perhaps Medinat Yisra’el could benefit from some of the wisdom which was originally used to draft the American constitution and laws, while discarding that which has caused the United States to depart from Torah principles and ideals.
 
From this point of departure, we now turn to a discourse on the judicial reforms which have been proposed for Medinat Yisra’el.

​The power of a court to invalidate a law by declaring the law to be in conflict with some provision of a constitution or other superior law, known generally as the power of Judicial Review, is not a judicial power which is essential to the performance of judicial duties.  Courts which lack the power of judicial review still possess the ability to adjudicate cases; they simply lack the ability to declare a law invalid.
 
The U.S. Constitution, for example, contains no written grant of authority for American courts to exercise the power of judicial review.  Indeed, prior to the U.S. Supreme Court, in the year 1803, conferring upon itself the power of judicial review when deciding the case of Marbury v. Madison, the power of judicial review did not exist in American jurisprudence.  Similarly, Israel’s quasi-constitutional Basic Laws do not grant the Israel Supreme Court the power of judicial review.  Nevertheless, in a manner similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, the Israel Supreme Court, in a 1995 decision in a case involving Mizrahi Bank, claimed for itself the power of judicial review.
 
In addition to conferring upon itself a general power to declare legislation invalid, the Israel Supreme Court has gone infinitely further by also conferring on itself the power to declare an act of government invalid simply because a majority of the court’s judges deem the act to be “unreasonable.”  As with the power to invalidate legislation through the use of judicial review, neither Israel’s founding, nor governing, documents grant the Israel Supreme Court the power to invalidate the actions of the Israel government, let alone to do so simply because the Israel Supreme Court considers those acts to have been “unreasonable.”
 
The folly of the Israel Supreme Court’s reasonableness doctrine is illustrated by that court’s January 18, 2023, ruling, which held that Aryeh Deri is ineligible to serve as a member of the Knesset (parliament) and that the Prime Minister therefore must dismiss Deri from the Knesset, despite Deri having been duly appointed to the Knesset by the political party of which he is a member.  In support of its ruling, the Israel Supreme Court explained that Deri’s appointment to the Knesset was invalid because such appointment would be “unreasonable” in light of Deri’s past criminal convictions, which include both a 1999 conviction for bribery and a 2022 conviction for tax fraud, in which Deri reportedly represented to the criminal court, as part of a plea agreement, that Deri would retire from politics.
 
The Israel Supreme Court might very well be correct that it is “unreasonable,” in light of Deri’s criminal convictions, to allow Deri to serve as a member of the Knesset.  The problem, however, is that “reasonableness” is not the legal standard, as set forth in Israeli law, by which the eligibility or fitness of a Member of the Knesset is to be determined.  As the U.S. Supreme Court said when it seized for itself the power of judicial review, “It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.137, 177 (1 Cranch) (1803).  Implicit in this statement, of course, is the idea that it is emphatically not the duty (or right) of the Judicial Department to create law or to say what the law should be.  Likewise, it is emphatically not the province of courts to rule based on what judges personally consider to be reasonable or unreasonable.
 
The important differences between the U.S. Supreme Court taking for itself the power of judicial review and the Israel Supreme Court taking for itself the power of judicial review, including the extraordinary power to invalidate government acts which the court deems to have been “unreasonable,” are that:
 
(1) The United States, unlike Israel, has a constitution which can be amended through the democratic process.  Thus, if the U.S. Supreme Court declares a law to be unconstitutional, there are processes, set forth in the U.S. Constitution itself, to amend the Constitution through use of the democratic process.  Israel, on the other hand, currently lacks both a constitution and a process whereby the elected members of government can, in effect, overrule a decision of the unelected judges who sit on the Israel Supreme Court.  Another of the judicial reforms which is now being considered by the Knesset is legislation known as an “Override Clause,” which, if passed into law, would provide the elected members of the Israel government with a procedure to overrule a decision of the Israel Supreme Court.
 
(2) Unlike the Israel Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court has never claimed for itself the general, and extra-constitutional, power to invalidate government acts on the ground of “reasonableness.”  (The U.S. constitutional ban on “unreasonable searches and seizures,” which is found in the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, is not comparable to the “reasonableness doctrine” established by the Israel Supreme Court.  Most importantly, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, unlike Israel’s general “reasonableness doctrine” was adopted through the democratic process.  Also, the Fourth Amendment’s ban on “unreasonable searches and seizures” is, by its own terms, both narrow in scope and applicable only to government’s conduct vis-à-vis non-governmental persons and entities.  Israel’s “reasonableness doctrine,” by contrast, is a judicially-created doctrine which claims for the Israel Supreme Court an unconstrained power to invalidate any and all acts of government which the Israel Supreme Court deems “unreasonable.”)
 
Thus, unlike the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Israel’s “reasonableness doctrine” is nothing more than an undemocratic judicial creation which was wholly constructed and implemented by the Israel Supreme Court, and which has absolutely no basis in law or the democratic process.
 
In conclusion, courts are fully able to perform their role of deciding cases without possessing the power of judicial review, that is, the power to invalidate laws.  Thus, there is no imperative to grant a court, or allow a court to seize for itself, the power of Judicial Review.  However, in legal systems which are based on a constitution (which cannot be changed by the judiciary), the power of judicial review does not present a threat to democracy or liberty, as long as the people, through their elected representatives, have the right and the power to amend their constitution.

​It should, but apparently does not, go without saying that, in a democracy, (unelected) judges should not have any role whatsoever in the appointment of other (unelected) judges.
 
Israel’s proposed judicial reforms, which address the appointment of judges to the Israel Supreme Court, would, if passed, still allow sitting judges to have some input on the appointment of proposed judges.  Thus, the proposed reforms, as applied to the appointment of judges, do not go far enough to reform Israel’s system of judicial appointments.

​On February 2, 2023, the Israel Attorney General sent a letter to the Prime Minister which purported to order the Prime Minister to not involve himself in the legislative process relating to pending proposals for judicial reforms.
 
As with the appointment of judges, it should, but apparently does not, go without saying that, in a democracy, unelected attorneys general should not presume to dictate the legislative actions or inactions of the elected members of a government.
 
An elected government official may request a legal opinion from an attorney general, or even receive from that attorney general an unsolicited legal opinion; however, as with any attorney-client relationship, the client must be free to wholly disregard the advice of counsel, regardless of how foolish disregarding that advice might be.

​More than a decade and a half ago, an esteemed Jewish-American jurist and professor of law wrote, “Israel is an immature democracy, poorly governed; its political class is mediocre and corrupt; it floats precariously in a lethally hostile Muslim sea; and it really could use a constitution.”  Richard A. Posner, “Enlightened Despot (reviewing Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (2006)),” New Republic, April 2007, at p.53.
 
Unfortunately, not much has changed since 2007.  Although the judicial reforms which are currently under consideration will, if enacted, undoubtedly benefit Medinat Yisra’el, what Medinat Yisra’el could really use is a constitutional convention, which would fully and completely replace Medinat Yisra’el’s current “Basic Laws” with the Jewish Constitution, that is, with the Torah.  Only then will “Israel” truly be a “Jewish State.”

​Member of the Knesset (MK) and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir recently sponsored legislation that would amend a law which dates back to the 1926, pre-state of Israel, British Mandate era and which vests in the national Police Commissioner the legal right to formulate and implement the State of Israel’s law enforcement policy.
 
The amendment proposed by MK Ben-Gvir, would, if ultimately passed into law, transfer the authority to make law enforcement policy from the unelected national Police Commissioner to the elected National Security Minister.
 
The Labor Party has mounted political opposition in the Knesset to the proposed police reform law.  Apparently not wanting to rely on political opposition alone, the Labor Party has also filed a petition with the Israel Supreme Court which seeks a ruling on the “constitutionality” of the law.
 
Of course, no law in the State of Israel can properly be considered “constitutional” or “unconstitutional,” because, notwithstanding a requirement in the State’s founding documents, the State of Israel has never adopted a constitution.  This, however, is a subject for another day.
 
In challenging the “Ben-Gvir Law,” the Labor Party has argued that the law “could lead the State of Israel towards (sic) becoming a ‘police state,’ in which the police becomes (sic) an armed force at the service of political parties, contrary to its intended role of fair and impartial law enforcement.”
 
This argument ignores the fact that police commissioners, just like elected politicians, possess political opinions and preferences.  The only material difference is that politicians are, at least in theory, accountable to the electorate, while non-elected police commissioners clearly are not constrained by any such accountability.
 
The Labor Party, without reference to any particular parliamentary rule, has also argued that proper procedures were not followed in passing the law.
 
The role of the judiciary is, of course, to apply the law to the facts of a case which involves proper litigants who claim and deny, respectively, that they have suffered a cognizable legal harm.
 
Here, we have a political party asking the Judiciary to invalidate proposed legislation, on the grounds that: (1) the Knesset is not following proper parliamentary procedures with respect to its consideration of proposed legislation and (2) the proposed law is “unconstitutional,” which, for our purposes should be interpreted as “invalid” as the result of its alleged conflict, or other incompatibility, with some unspecified, pre-existing and valid law.

​As an initial matter, unless and until proposed legislation is actually passed into law, any litigation challenging the validity of a proposed law is premature.  In legal jargon, a plaintiff lacks standing to bring or maintain such a case because the legal issue is not yet “ripe;” that is, there is not yet (and may never be if the legislation is ultimately not passed into law, or is passed into law in a form different from that which is currently being considered) any legal issue for a court to decide.

The Knesset, as the legislative body of the State of Israel, enjoys equal stature with, and, thus, not subject to the jurisdiction of, the Judiciary.
 
Elected officials are often thought of as enjoying special privileges and perks that are not enjoyed by the electorate at-large.  However, in the context of legislators suing their Legislature for the latter’s alleged failure to follow its own rules, the former are, and necessarily must be, at a distinct disadvantage as compared with, for example, minority stockholders who want to sue the corporation of which they are a part owner.
 
Courts exist to rule on legal disputes such as those involving minority stockholders and the corporations which they partially own.  Courts not only have a duty to decide the merits of such cases, they have an obligation to do so.
 
The Knesset and its political minority members, however, are not analogous to a corporation that is sued by a minority of its stockholders.  Because the Knesset is of equal stature with the Judiciary, it follows that the Knesset may not be held by the Judiciary to answer claims that the Knesset violated Knesset procedures or rules when conducting its legislative business.  Unlike the claims of minority stockholders, similar claims by minority legislators constitute non-justiciable political questions, not legal questions which are within the competence of courts to decide.

​The Labor Party also claims that the “Ben-Gvir Law” is invalid because it allegedly conflicts or is otherwise incompatible with some unspecified pre-existing and valid law.
 
As mentioned above, the role of the judiciary is to apply the law to the facts of a case which involves proper litigants who claim and deny, respectively, that they have suffered a cognizable legal harm.
 
Whether a litigant has suffered a cognizable legal harm, in turn, depends upon whether the plaintiff has suffered a particularized and concrete injury, that is, an injury that is specific to the plaintiff, as opposed to a harm that is generally shared by all, or by a significant portion of, the members of society at large.
 
Here, any injury sustained by the Labor Party, or by any of its members, and which was caused by the alleged invalidity of the Ben-Gvir Law, consists of no more than the generalized and non-specific injury which was sustained by all or most members of society as a result of the alleged invalidity of the law.
 
Arguably, the Police Commissioner may suffer a particularized and concrete injury if the “Ben-Gvir Law” actually becomes law, in that certain of the Police Commissioner’s policymaking powers will have been diminished by the transfer of those powers from the Commissioner to the National Security Minister.
 
Thus, although the Police Commissioner might have standing to challenge the validity of the “Ben-Gvir Law,” if and when the Ben-Gvir Law actually becomes law, the Labor Party and its members clearly lack standing, either now or in the future, to do so.
 
In summary, as a matter of law, a plaintiff, including the Labor Party, lacks standing to challenge proposed legislation, as such legislation may never become law.  Additionally, because any alleged failure of the Knesset to follow its rules or procedures when considering whether to enact laws constitutes a non-justiciable political question and because legislators lack standing to challenge the general validity of proposed (or enacted) legislation, the Israel Supreme Court should dismiss the Labor Party’s lawsuit.

The State of Israel has one, national, police department.  Unlike some other countries, each city or region in Israel does not have its own separate and independent police department.  Israel’s one and only police department provides civilian law enforcement services to all areas of the country where civilian law enforcement is conducted.

The highest-ranking police officer in Israel, the police administrator from whom all other police officers in the country take their orders, is the Police Commissioner.  Needless to say, the Police Commissioner possesses an enormous amount of power.

The Israel Police fall under the purview of the Ministry of Internal Security [המשרד לביטחון הפנים], which oversees not only the Israel Police, but also the Israel Prison Service and the Israel National Fire and Rescue Services.

The “Government of Israel” [ממשלת ישראל], also known informally as the “Cabinet of Israel” is the executive “branch” of the Israeli government.  The Government of Israel is composed of various ministers who are selected by, and who serve at the pleasure of, the Prime Minister.  These ministers, in turn, typically have “portfolios,” that is, they occupy the senior-most position in one or more ministries.  With the exception of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, ministers in the Government of Israel need not be members of the Knesset [הכנסת], Israel’s (unicameral) legislature, although typically, ministers are also concurrent members of the Knesset [הכנסת].

The role of the Knesset [הכנסת] is to pass laws, elect the (ceremonial) president of Israel, approve the membership of ministers in the Government of Israel, and supervise the work of the Government of Israel.

The Prime Minister, who is appointed by the Knesset [הכנסת], as the Head of Government, is the chief executive officer of the State of Israel.

Summarizing the structure of the Israeli government, the members of the Knesset [הכנסת] (legislature) select a prime minister (Israel’s chief executive officer).  The prime minster then selects the ministers who head the various ministries in the executive “branch” of government (Government of Israel), including the Ministry of Internal Security [המשרד לביטחון הפנים], which ostensibly has control over the Israel Police.

Notwithstanding placement of the Israel Police under the Ministry of Internal Security [המשרד לביטחון הפנים], Israel Police regulations currently provide that the unelected Police Commissioner, rather than the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (who is accountable to the Prime Minister), has the sole authority to determine police policy.  Such policy decisions include whether Jews who openly pray on Har HaBayit (Temple Mount) [הר הבית] will be arrested and criminally prosecuted and whether, and to what extent, enforcement operations on more routine matters will be undertaken and, if so, prioritized.

In other words, the elected members of government (or, more precisely, members of a political party that stood for election) have absolutely no legal authority to decide or control policy which guides police operations; the legal ability to create and implement such policy resides exclusively with the unelected police commissioner.

In a democracy, which the State of Israel claims to be, it is imperative that a politician who is accountable to the electorate, and not an unelected government official, be the final authority on matters of government policy.  This is true when the policy relates to a local or regional police department and is especially true when it relates to a national police department.

Proposed legislation was recently introduced in the Knesset [הכנסת] which, if passed into law, would divest the police commissioner of the authority to create policy, transfer that authority to the Minister of Internal Security.  Under the proposed law, the police commissioner would be given the responsibility of “manag[ing] the police in accordance with the policy and general principles that the minister will outline.”

Thus, if passed into law, this proposed legislation will transfer to an elected official (or at least a member of a political party that stood for election) the responsibility for making police policy.  The proposed law also relegates to the police commissioner – an unelected official – the responsibility of implementing that policy.  This, of course, is how government in a democratic society should work.

Only in police states, which by their very nature are tyrannical, do we find the situation where unelected officials, who are not answerable to elected officials, decide police policy and enforcement priorities.

Naturally, as we might expect from any unelected government bureaucrat who faces a diminution of his power, the current Police Commissioner, along with several dozen former Police Commissioners, oppose this reform.  Comments in opposition include, for example, “the independence of the police is essential in a democratic country” and “[l]eave state security and law enforcement out of politics.”  Sadly, what those who oppose this proposed reform fail to understand is that the determination of policy which guides the operations of “state security and law enforcement” are, by definition, political questions which, in a democratic society, can be answered only by elected officials.

The proposed legislation which would transfer to the Minister of Internal Security the right to make policy for the Israel Police, and to concurrently divest the Police Commissioner of that power, is a step in the right direction.

​
IMPORTANT NOTE TO READERS:  This article is not, and should not be interpreted as, an indictment of the Holy Land of Israel (חס ושלום); rather, this article merely highlights an aspect of the secular government of the State of Israel that is in dire need of reform.  “Patriotism is supporting your country all the time, and your government [only] when it deserves it.”  Mark Twain.

​During a recent public speech at Ben Gurion University, Aviv Kochavi, the Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), reportedly said that “[o]nly the commanders in the IDF will determine its . . . orders. . . ”  See, ​Military Misconduct from Hebron.  In other words, General Kochavi was saying that only [I, Aviv Kochavi, commander of] the commanders in the IDF and not Israel’s democratically-elected political leaders, “will determine [the IDF’s] orders.”

Such a public repudiation by the highest-ranking military officer in a self-described democratic country is nothing short of amazing; it’s the type of statement one might typically expect from a third-world military dictatorship, not a Western-style democracy which possess nuclear weapons.  Even the generals of the most totalitarian Communist countries would never publicly repudiate civilian control over a county’s military.

Less than a week later, it was leaked that General Kochavi, after apparently not having been disciplined for his public repudiation of civilian control over the IDF, “doubled-down” on that position when he reportedly said that he “won’t allow any [civilian] interference in the appointment of IDF generals.  There is no possibility of this happening.”

The purpose of a county’s military is, in the arena of foreign affairs, to use force to defend the country’s sovereignty and to advance the country’s foreign political objectives.  Thus, civilian control over a democratic county’s military must include – by definition – that elected civilian political leaders not merely be involved in the selection of its country’s generals, but that these civilian political leaders have the final say in selection the country’s generals.

General Kochavi’s lack of understanding, at best, or refusal to accept, at worst, civilian political control of the IDF is both troubling and dangerous.  It is simply not acceptable for a military officer, especially one who controls nuclear weapons, to refuse to accept civilian political control over the military. It is for this reason that General Kochavi should immediately be relieved of his command and stripped of his rank.
​

IMPORTANT NOTE TO READERS:​  This article is not, and should not be interpreted as, an indictment of the Holy Land of Israel (חס ושלום); rather, this article merely highlights an aspect of the secular government of the State of Israel that is in dire need of reform.  “Patriotism is supporting your country all the time, and your government [only] when it deserves it.”  Mark Twain.

​During late November 2022, an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldier who was assigned to the Hebron area allegedly assaulted, without justification, a civilian protester who sympathizes with the Arab residents in that area.  Another on-duty IDF soldier verbally proclaimed that a certain recently-elected Israeli politician would “restore order” in Hebron.  According to news reports, the soldier who made the political comment was promptly sentenced to ten days’ confinement, which was later reduced to six days’ confinement, while unspecified discipline was imposed on the other soldier.
 
No reasonable person would deny that laws and regulations which govern the conduct of military personnel (at least those from supposedly democratic countries) universally prohibit both assaulting others without legal justification and expressing personal political opinions while on-duty and in uniform.  Thus, assuming the truth of the allegations, the two aforementioned IDF soldiers who were assigned to Hebron clearly acted inappropriately.
 
In response to the allegations against the soldiers, IDF Chief of the General Staff Aviv Kochavi was quoted as saying the alleged misconduct by these two soldiers is “extremely serious and contrary to the values ​​of the IDF and its orders.”
 
Kochavi was further quoted as saying that:

To summarize, two soldiers allegedly engaged in misconduct which could properly be characterized as moderate to minor, conduct which was promptly and publicly denounced by the military’s Chief of the General Staff.  That should have been the end of the story.
 
The Chief of the General Staff, who holds the rank of “Rav-Aluf” [רב-אלוף], which is commonly translated as “Lieutenant General” (three-star general) is the highest-ranking military officer in the IDF (the IDF does not have a rank equivalent to that of a four-star general).
 
About a week after publicly denouncing the alleged misconduct of the two IDF soldiers under his command, and apparently not wanting to leave good enough alone, Rav-Aluf [Lieutenant General] Kochavi, while speaking at an event at Ben Gurion University, revisited the Hebron incident, reportedly saying “[t]he IDF has a code of values and it is called the spirit of the IDF, it does not change and remains constant. Only the commanders in the IDF will determine its values, the orders, the handling of events and the handling of people” (emphasis added).
 
Let us stop and dwell for a moment on exactly what Rav-Aluf [Lieutenant General] Kochavi reportedly said and the context in which he made these comments.  “Only the commanders in the IDF will determine its . . . orders.”  “Only the commanders in the IDF will determine . . . the handling of events and the handling of people.”
 
What happened at Ben Gurion University was the highest-ranking military officer in the country, publicly commenting on the actions of two soldiers, both likely low-ranking draftees, one of whom allegedly assaulted a protester who is sympathetic to the hostile Arab population in Hebron, a population who are the sole reason for the deployment of soldiers in that town, and the other who allegedly remarked that a recently-elected politician will “restore order” in Hebron.  These two soldiers, apparently, do not think their military commanders are doing a good job in dealing with the hostile Arab population in Hebron.
 
During his speech at Ben Gurion University, Rav-Aluf [Lieutenant General] Kochavi responded to the two Hebron soldiers’ apparent lack of confidence in their military superiors.  “Only [I, Aviv Kochavi, commander of] the commanders in the IDF” and not the democratically-elected political leaders, such as the recently-elected politician whom one soldier apparently believes will restore order in Hebron, “will determine [the IDF’s] orders.”
 
Although it’s certainly problematic when low-ranking soldiers publicly express a lack of confidence in their military commanders, it’s quite another matter altogether when a country’s highest-ranking military officer publicly proclaims that he, and he alone, “will determine [the military’s] orders.”  Such a statement is nothing short of public declaration that the military, and not the country’s elected civilian leaders, are in control of the government.  This is nothing short of a coup d’état in the making.
 
Israel claims to be a “democratic” country.  If Israel is a democracy, and if it hopes to remain a democracy, it must ensure that its military leaders fully understand and accept that they are subordinate to the country’s civilian leadership.  Furthermore, any military officer who refuses to accept civilian control of the military, especially when such military officer disagrees with the country’s civilian leadership, deserves not just a six-day jail sentence, but rather, should immediately be relieved of his command and permanently stripped of his rank and all military benefits.

IMPORTANT NOTE TO READERS:  This article is not, and should not be interpreted as, an indictment of the Holy Land of Israel (חס ושלום); rather, this article merely highlights an aspect of the secular government of the State of Israel that is in dire need of reform.  “Patriotism is supporting your country all the time, and your government [only] when it deserves it.”  Mark Twain.

On September 1, 2022, the Israel Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Amiram Ben Uliel, who was found guilty of the 2015 arson murders of a family of three.
 
On appeal, Ben Uliel challenged the admissibility of his confessions, arguing that the confessions should have been excluded from evidence because they were obtained by police through the use of torture, rather than given voluntarily.

​Accordingly, the only issue that was properly before the court on appeal was whether the trial court erred by admitting Ben Uliel’s confessions into evidence.

In its opinion affirming Ben Uliel’s convictions, the Israel Supreme Court acknowledged that Ben Uliel remained silent during the first 17 days of his in-custody interrogations and that he “confessed” only after police employed “special [interrogation] measures.”  Failing to address the issue of whether evidence illegally obtained by police should be admissible at trial to prove a defendant’s guilt, the Israel Supreme Court wrote, “There is no doubt that it was he [Ben Uliel] who committed this terrible deed.”  Based on the Court’s statement, Israeli police might now reasonably conclude that confessions which are obtained through an illegal use of force are lawful, as long as the crime is sufficiently “terrible” and there is “no doubt” as to a defendant’s guilt.  How the police are to know, during a pre-trial investigation, that there is “no doubt” as to potential defendant’s guilt is a question the Court apparently left for another day.
 
The concern that the Court’s opinion might encourage future police misconduct was not lost on at least one member of the Court.  Judge Yosef Elron wrote, “I will admit that I remain troubled to a certain extent about the future, given the message sent to the investigative bodies in view of this outcome.”
 
The “Exclusionary Rule” is a rule of evidence which provides that illegally obtained evidence of a crime is generally inadmissible at trial to prove a defendant’s guilt.  Judge Benjamin Cardozo, a respected American jurist from the early 1900s, criticized the rule, stating that application of the rule allows, “[t]he criminal . . . to go free because the constable has blundered.”
 
Judge Cardozo, in his criticism of the rule, was exactly correct.  Applying the Exclusionary Rule might sometimes – but not always – allow the guilty to go free.  It should never be forgotten, however, that government, vis-à-vis the individual, is the holder of extraordinary power and that civil liberties can be protected only through a meaningful restraint on the exercise of that power.
 
Thus, although application of the Exclusionary Rule might, on occasion, allow the guilty to go free, the rule promotes the greater good by incentivizing government to refrain from committing the “terrible deed” of exercising its vast powers in an unlawful manner, powers which far exceed the capability of any criminal defendant to commit a “terrible deed.”
 
The Exclusionary Rule is commonly understood to have been adopted in American jurisprudence by the 1961 U.S. Supreme Court case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  However, general application of the rule in U.S. courts can be traced to at least 1886.  Zoo v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (applying the rule to the compelled production of business papers).  In the context of coerced confessions, use of the rule in U.S. courts can be traced to at least 1897.  Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
 
The history of the rule, however, goes back much further in time and place, to England, which of course is the source of America’s judicial system and early precedent.  Roe v. Harvey, 98 Eng. Rep. 302 (K.B. 1769).
 
Over the course of the centuries, the contours and breadth of the Exclusionary Rule have often been the subject of judicial dispute.  Nevertheless, British and American courts have consistently held that, at a minimum, the rule should always be construed broadly enough to encompass coerced confessions.
 
Israel, of course, is not England, nor is it the United States.  Nevertheless, Israel considers itself to be a “democracy” and, consistent with this characterization, has incorporated a large body of both British and American jurisprudence into its legal system.  Indeed, Israel’s parliamentary structure of government is modeled after the British “Westminster” system and the substance of many of Israel’s laws and legal procedures are derived from British and American sources.  Thus, it would be quite inconsistent for Israel to repudiate a legal principle which is as foundational and settled in the jurisprudence of Western democracies as is the Exclusionary Rule, especially as applied to coerced confessions.
 
In the opinion affirming his conviction, the Israel Supreme Court also said that Ben Uliel’s “actions contradict and conflict with all moral values and Jewish culture.”
 
If the Torah did not exist, G-d forbid, there could be no Jews and, by extension, no Jewish nation, no Jewish state, and, of course, no morals or Jewish culture.  Thus, it is not possible to analyze “moral values and Jewish culture,” let alone Jewish law, without reference to Torah.
 
Jewish law, that is, real Jewish law, as set forth in Halakha, provides that confessions are inadmissible – under all circumstances – to prove a defendant’s guilt.  Masekhet Sanhedrin 9b.  The rule which makes confessions inadmissible was likely derived, by inference, from the fact that nowhere in Tanakh or Talmud is there any provision for the interrogation of arrestees or criminal defendants.  It follows, of course, that if all confessions are inadmissible, there is little concern that government will torture defendants in an effort to obtain confessions.
 
The Jewish rule – the Halakha – which excludes all confessions, is consistent with other, related aspects of Jewish criminal procedure, as both the former and the latter are weighted in favor of the defendant.  In other words, the effect of the Exclusionary Rule, which Judge Cardozo criticized as allowing “[t]he criminal . . . to go free because the constable has blundered,” is a concept which the Torah fully supports and endorses.
 
The issue of whether coerced confessions should be admissible in criminal proceedings vividly illustrates the age-old dichotomy between the collective security of society and the personal liberties of individuals.  Where personal liberties are weighted too heavily, unregulated societal anarchy will follow.  Where the security of society is weighted too heavily, totalitarianism, a police state, will follow.  As history has shown, time and again, police states are much more common than are unregulated societal anarchies.
 
The State of Israel is less than 100 years old.  It was founded by socialists, based on socialist principles.  Socialist doctrine, in turn, rejects anything and everything, including HaShem and His Torah, which occupy a position which is more authoritative than the State.
 
In order to acquire and maintain power, socialist regimes the world over have relied – and continue to rely – on the empty and false promise of collective security.  The so-called “bargain” goes like this: “The government will provide security, if individuals will voluntarily relinquish their individual civil liberties.”
 
A judicial system which allows the use of coerced confessions is a judicial system which not only condones the use of such confessions, but is also a system which encourages government agents to obtain such confessions in the first place.  The well-earned name that history has assigned to such regimes, that is, regimes where the ends justify the means, is none other than: “Police State.”

Two important steps for preventing the creation of – or dismantling – a police state are:
(1) the adoption and use of an Exclusionary Rule and

​(2) the creation and implementation of a meaningful system of civil damage awards that hold both government agencies and individual government agents financially responsible for the commission of knowing and willful violations of civil rights.
​
Unfortunately, the 2007 assessment of Israel, made by the esteemed American jurist Richard A. Poser, is as valid today as it was then: “Israel is an immature democracy, poorly governed; its political class is mediocre and corrupt; it floats precariously in a lethally hostile Muslim sea; and it really could use a constitution.”  Richard A. Posner, “Enlightened Despot (reviewing Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (2006)),” New Republic, April 2007, at p.53.

​If there is an overriding theme that runs through Torah, it is that HaShem separated the Jewish people from the other peoples of the world; that He designated Eretz Yisra’el as the one and only homeland for this separate people to “dwell alone;” and that to secure the blessings that HaShem has promised, the Jewish people must obey His commands.  One of these commands is, of course, to Yishuv Eretz Yisra’el, that is, for Jews to make Aliyah (immigrate to Eretz Yisra’el) and settle the Land.
 
The important statistic, however, is not how many Jews make Aliyah each year, but rather, the net increase in the number of Jews who make Aliyah each year.  That is, the important statistic is the number of Jews who make Aliyah each year, reduced by the number of Jews who, after making Aliyah, leave Israel each year and return to their country of origin.
 
According to some reports, as many as 40% of Olim from the United States return to America within two years of making Aliyah, while 60% return within five years.  Although this statistic is, due to a lack of transparency by the Israeli government, difficult to confirm, it is an interesting statistic, especially in light of the fact that the Israeli government, on a monthly basis, provides new Olim with unearned cash (welfare) payments for the first five years after they immigrate, and that the monthly amount of those cash payments peak during year 2.
 
Through discussions with prospective Olim in the U.S., as well as Olim in Medinat Yisra’el (“the State of Israel” or, simply, the “Medinat”), several things become apparent.  First, many U.S. rabbinical leaders discourage Aliyah.  Second, notwithstanding U.S. rabbinical opposition to Aliyah, there are many religious Jews in the U.S. who make Aliyah, or who plan to make Aliyah.  Third, and most important to a discussion on maximizing the numbers of net Olim, is that the primary obstacle encountered by most Jews who are considering Aliyah is that of achieving and maintaining financial self-sufficiency post-Aliyah.
 
For the purpose of analyzing their financial situation, Olim can be classified as being either:
1. Medical or High-Tech professionals,
2. Persons with a foreign source of income (e.g., retirees, remote workers, etc.), or
3. Other (not falling in category 1 or 2).
 
Due to a market demand for employees, Olim who are medical or high-tech professionals appear likely to have the least difficulty integrating into the Israeli job market.  Persons with a foreign source of income are also less likely to experience significant post-Aliyah economic difficulties.
 
Although Olim in Categories 1 and 2 may leave the Medinat as a result of post-Aliyah financial difficulties, the subset of Category 3 Olim which consist of Olim who made Aliyah from a comparatively affluent (e.g., Western) country, appear to be the group of Olim who are most likely to return to their country of origin due to post-Aliyah financial hardship.  Thus, the Aliyah failure rate for Category 1 and Category 2 Olim might be lower than the 40% and 60% rates mentioned above, while the Aliyah failure rate for the subset of Category 3 Olim from Western countries may be significantly higher than the 40% and 60% rates mentioned above.
 
In order best assist all Olim in overcoming the challenge which is likely responsible for the highest rate of post-Aliyah departures to a Western country of origin, that is, to assist Olim in overcoming the challenge of achieving – and maintaining – economic self-sufficiency post-Aliyah, it is necessary to examine a little economic history.
 
The economies of the Medinat and the U.S. are practically mirror opposites.  The U.S. was officially founded almost 250 years ago, with the signing of the Declaration of Independence.  However, in the year 1620, more than 400 years ago, the Pilgrims, the predecessors of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, arrived in, and began settling portions of, what is now the United States of America.
 
The Pilgrims were a very religious group of Christians who analogized their voyage across the Atlantic Ocean to the Jews’ trek through the wilderness while en-route from Har Sinai to Eretz Yisra’el.  The Pilgrims also analogized their conquest of the “New World,” that is, to what would become the United States, to the Jews’ conquest of Eretz Yisra’el.  When the Pilgrims first sighted land from their ship, the Mayflower, they joined together in a communal recitation of Tehillim 100.
 
As an indication of how important Tanakh was to the founding generations of Americans, some early courses at Harvard University were taught in Hebrew and, as late as 1817, an annual speech was given in Hebrew at Harvard.

Tanakh also had an influence at Yale University.  Some early courses at Yale were taught in Hebrew and Yale’s coat of arms contained Hebrew letters which spelled the words “Urim and Thummim,” which the university translated as “Light and Truth.”
 
Being Christian students of Tanakh, the Pilgrims modeled the constitutions and laws of their “Promised Land,” of the original 13 Colonies or “states,” on Biblical principles.
 
Unfortunately, however, the Pilgrims’ understanding of Tanakh left quite a bit to be desired.  On July 1, 1620, the Pilgrims, prior to departing Plymouth, England, signed a seven-year contract in which they agreed to pool “all profits and benefits that are got by trade, traffic, trucking, working, fishing, or any other means of any person or persons. . . .”  The contract further provided “that at the end of the seven years, the capital and profits, viz. the houses, lands, goods and chattels, be equally divided. . . .”  In other words, the Pilgrims brought socialism to America.
 
However, instead of lasting seven years, the Pilgrims’ experiment with socialism failed after a mere two years.  Shortages and starvation abounded, and about fifty-percent of the colonists died of starvation and related illnesses.
 
Under the leadership of their Governor, William Bradford, the Pilgrims scuttled their socialist experiment and adopted a free-market economy.  The effects of a free-market economy were both immediate and dramatic.  When the Pilgrims were allowed to retain the fruits of their labor, productivity – and prosperity – increased almost overnight.
 
Since abandoning its extremely short, but disastrous, experiment with socialism in favor of the free-market, America – and its economy – has grown from a handful of fledgling colonies to become the greatest economy the world has ever known.  The only thing that is now harming America, the only thing which has ever harmed America, is its rejection and distancing of itself from Torah values.
 
Medinat Yisra’el, on the other hand, is not 400 years old; rather, it is a mere 74 years old.
 
The Medinat, unlike the United States, was founded by socialists, who implemented socialist policies.  A “guiding principle” of socialism is that nothing – including HaShem – can be more authoritative or powerful than the State.  One very important method that socialism employs to ensure that its monopoly on power is not threatened is the collective ownership of property, that is, the abrogation of the free-market and private property rights.
 
The Torah, however, rejects socialism.  This rejection can be seen as early as parashat Noah, with the story of the Tower of Babel, which is in Sefer Bereshit, right after the Flood.  One need not look too far from the Tower of Babel to see other Divine endorsements of the free-market and the private ownership of property.  The Ten Statements (“Commandments”) explicitly proscribe theft; a very large percentage of the 613 misvot deal, in one way or another, with free-market commercial transactions and property rights; and there are tractates of the Gemara which likewise focus on the private ownership of property and voluntary commerce.
 
The Medinat, like the United States, also suffered through a failure of socialism.
 
During the years 1978-1979, inflation in the Medinat, caused by government manipulation of the money supply, averaged 77 percent.  By 1984-1985, the annual rate of inflation peaked at a staggering 450 percent!  U.S. president Ronald Reagan offered the Medinat a $1.5 billion grant if the Medinat would abandon socialism and adopt free-market economic principles.  The Histadrut, the Medinat’s labor union, objected.  U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz responded with the threat that if the Medinat did not start implementing free-market economic policies, the United States would freeze all monetary transfers to the Medinat.  The threat worked and the Medinat, although being “dragged kicking and screaming,” started to implement the free-market “recommendations” that were made by the Reagan Administration.
 
As a part of its economic restructuring, the Medinat, on January 1, 1986, introduced, the New Israeli Shekel (NIS), which replaced the hyper-inflated Shekel at a rate of 1000:1.
 
Like the impact of free-market principles on the Pilgrims’ colony under William Bradford, the impact on the Israeli economy which resulted from the implementation of free-market principles was both immediate and dramatic.  Within one year, Israeli’s annual rate of inflation fell from an astounding 450% to 20%.
 
Unfortunately, however, the Medinat’s mid-1980s forced move away from some socialist policies is not the end of its story of economic failure.  Unlike America’s Pilgrims, Israel did not fully repudiate socialism.  Rather, many of Israel’s socialist policies persist to this day, causing an unnecessary and significant burden on the Medinat’s economy.  As the Pilgrims learned under the leadership of William Bradford, and as Israelis should have learned from the Medinat’s 1980s economic reform, socialism destroys an economy, while free-markets allow an economy to grow and flourish.  Accordingly, the Medinat could best assist Olim by implementing economic policies that will not only benefit Olim, but policies that will benefit all Israelis.  Those policies include:

1. Significantly lowering tax (personal, businesses, VAT/sales) rates.
2. Eliminating import and export taxes.
3. Eliminating wage and price controls.
4. Repealing labor and employment laws that hinder or otherwise interfere with at-will employment.
5. Repeal laws which create private-sector monopolies.
6. Privatize businesses which are currently operated by the government.
7. Repeal laws which disincentivize investment in Israeli businesses, including laws which discourage entrepreneurs from opening new businesses.

 
Admittedly, these recommended policies cannot, and even should not, be implemented “overnight.”  However, efforts should be made to strategically implement free-market economic policies over the long-term.  Such long-term implementation should also include a refusal to extend or expand current policies, or to adopt new policies, which are incompatible with a free-market.
 
Free-market reforms, such as those mentioned above, will work.  Other, “more-of-the-same” reforms, such as increased welfare payments to Olim, while perhaps well-intentioned, can only result in “more-of-the-same” failed results that are currently being experienced.
 
Medinat Yisra’el has tried the secular, socialist approach, which has failed.  The Jewish State should now try the Jewish approach, that is, HaShem’s approach, the approach which is set forth in His Holy Torah and which G-d Himself has promised will succeed, if only it is tried.  If the Medinat were to switch to the Torah approach for Jewish governance, not just with respect to economic policies, but as to all policies, the Medinat will have become the Light Unto the Nations that HaShem wants the Jewish people to be.

​The “judicial power” of government consists not only of the raw power, but the obligation – the duty – to decide cases which are brought by and between adverse litigants.  The judicial power, like any governmental or other power, is capable of – some might even say prone to – being abused.
 
At one end of the spectrum which constitutes abuse of judicial power is “judicial activism,” which manifests when a court makes a ruling which is based on personal opinion, rather than on an impartial and reasoned examination of the law, vis-à-vis the facts of a particular case.
 
The Israel Supreme Court is often – and not without good cause – accused of “judicial activism.”
 
At the other end of the abuse of judicial power spectrum is the abdication of judicial responsibility, that is, the failure to perform the judicial duty of deciding a case which is properly before the court.
 
In a case which runs counter to the Israel Supreme Court’s reputation for judicial activism, an Israel trial court recently dismissed a case because it was unable to locate any judicial precedent upon which to base its decision.
 
Although the case presented a social issue which might attract public attention – on both sides of the political spectrum – the case has continuing importance for all Israelis, not for the legal issue it raised, but rather, for the method of decision which was employed by the Israeli trial court to dispose of the case.
 
The case started simply enough when two females (“Plaintiffs”) responded to an advertisement that had been posted by a landlord who was seeking to rent an apartment in Bat Yam, Israel (“Defendant”).  Plaintiffs met Defendant at the apartment and, during the course of showing the apartment to Plaintiffs, Defendant allegedly asked Plaintiffs whether they, Plaintiffs, were “roommates or sisters.” During the ensuing conversation, Defendant concluded that Plaintiffs are lesbians and, on that basis, refused to rent the apartment to them.
 
Plaintiffs, relying on a law which makes it illegal to discriminate when selling certain products and services, filed suit against Defendant.
 
The trial judge, noting that the Israel Supreme Court is divided on the issue of whether residential rental units fall within the scope of the law cited by Plaintiffs, dismissed Plaintiffs’ case.
 
The task of a trial court is to hear cases which are brought to it by proper litigants, to ascertain the facts, and to render a decision based on a reasoned and impartial application of the law to the facts.
 
Here, it was undisputed that Plaintiffs and Defendant were proper litigants.  Plaintiffs alleged Defendant discriminated against Plaintiffs in violation of a specific law.
 
Defendant did not claim that Defendant did not discriminate against Plaintiffs.  Rather, Defendant alleged that the law cited by Plaintiffs did not apply to the facts of the case.  Specifically, Defendant argued that the law cited by Plaintiffs does not make housing discrimination based on sexual orientation illegal.
 
In cases where an appellate court has ruled on the legal issue which is before the trial court, the trial court has a duty – and indeed obligation – to follow appellate court precedent.  Thus, if the Israel Supreme Court had previously ruled on the issue of whether the scope of the anti-discrimination law cited by Plaintiffs is broad enough to encompass housing discrimination, the Bat Yam trial court would be obliged to rule in accordance with that appellate court decision.
 
However, the absence of appellate court precedent does not absolve a trial court of its duty to decide a case on the merits.  If things were otherwise, there would be little need for trial courts.  In cases such as the Bat Yam housing discrimination case, a trial court’s duty, in addition to ascertaining the facts of a case, is to examine the law and decide the legal issue(s) raised by the parties.
 
Thus, in the Bat Yam case, the trial court had a duty to take into consideration the facts of the case, as established by the evidence; examine not only the text of the anti-discrimination law cited by Plaintiffs, but also the purpose of the law and the context in which it was passed, including any legislative history which might be available; and then render a decision on the merits of the case.
 
Dismissing a case because there is an absence of applicable appellate court precedent is nothing short of a complete abdication by the trial court of its judicial duty to decide the case.
 
If a country is to be governed by the Rule of Law, proper litigants with a legitimate legal dispute, such as Plaintiffs and Defendants in the Bat Yam housing discrimination case, have a right to a trial court decision on the merits.
 
If the Bat Yam trial court had rendered a decision on the merits, that is, if the Bat Yam court had entered a judgment either (1) in favor of Plaintiffs, stating that the anti-discrimination statute applies to housing discrimination cases, or (2) in favor of Defendant, stating that the statute does not apply to housing discrimination cases, an appellate court would then be afforded the opportunity to decide this previously undecided legal issue.  The resulting appellate decision would then be available to guide tenants and landlords, as well as to assist future Knessets (Israeli legislatures) in making or amending laws.
 
It simply is not possible for a society whose courts engage in either judicial activism or judicial abdication to long be a free society which is governed by the Rule of Law, rather than by the whim of those who hold government power.
 
If the State of Israel (Medinat Yisra’el) desires to be the Light Unto the Nations that HaShem intends it to be, it will need to undertake a long and hard road of judicial (and other governmental) reforms.  May HaShem bless the Medinat to begin implementing such reforms without further delay.

​Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, recently announced that it would be closed on the Jewish holiday of Tisha B’Av.  Translated from Hebrew into English, “Tisha B’Av” means, simply, the “9th day of [the Jewish month of] Av.”
 
Hebrew University professor Amiram Goldblum reportedly opposed the closure, writing: “Unbelievable – a shameful submission to the religious and to the Jewish religion in the State of Israel.  Sickening.” and

Arutz Sheva (August 1, 2022).
 
Tisha B’Av, a day on which religious Jews mourn, fast, and recite special prayers, commemorates the destruction in Jerusalem of the First Temple, by the Babylonians (423 BCE), and Second Temple, by the Romans (69 CE), as well as many other tragedies which have befallen the Jewish history on, “coincidentally,” the 9th day of Av., including, for example:

1. The Biblical story of the Israelite “spies,” who, prior to the Israelites’ crossing of the Jordan river and invasion of Eretz Yisra’el (the “Land of Israel” or “the Land”), reconnitored and returned with a negative report of the Land.  Parashat Shelah, Bamidbar 13:1, et seq.
2. The Roman defeat of Bar Kokhba in the Battle of Betar (133 CE).
3. The Romans plow over the Temple Mount (134 CE).
4. The Jews of England were expelled from that country (1290 CE).
5. The Jews of Spain were expelled from that country (1492 CE).
6. Germany declared war on Russia, effectively starting World War I (1914 CE), which, in turn, led to World War II and the Holocaust.

The common theme which runs through all of these tragedies is the loss or dimunition of Jewish sovereignty.  Jewish sovereignty was lost with the destruction of the First and Second Temples, the potential for Jewish sovereignty was lost or diminished when (1) the “spies,” through their negative report, attempted to dissuade the Israelites from invading Eretz Yisra’el; (2) the Romans defeated Bar Kokhba, in the Battle of Betar and, one year later, plowed over the Temple Mount; (3) the Jewish populations of England and Spain were expelled from those countries; and (4) Jewish emigration from Europe was prohibited, which resulted in six million Jews were exterminated during the Holocaust.
 
Thus, we see that the theme of Tisha B’Av is Jewish sovereignty or, more accurately, mourning the loss of, or potential for, Jewish sovereignty.
 
The modern-day State of Israel (“Medinat Yisra’el”), notwithstanding the State’s self-proclaimed assertion to the contrary, is not a “Jewish State.”  If it were, Medinat Yisra’el would be governed exclusively by Jews, for the sole benefit of Jews (which it currently is not), and by Torah law (which it also currently is not), rather than by the potpourri of laws which the State has adopted from a variety of foreign, non-Jewish, sources.
 
However, although Medinat Yisra’el is not a Jewish State, it has taken some steps in the right direction, one of which is to declare Jewish holy days – including Tisha B’Av – to be national holidays.
 
Professor Goldblum reportedly lamented that he doesn’t “recall [Hebrew] university ever closing for Muslim or Christian festivals."  That, however, is how it should be.  Although Medinat Yisra’el is not a “Jewish State,” it is a “state for Jews.”
 
Medinat Yisra’el was founded, out of the ashes of the Holocaust, as a state for Jews, a country to which Jews from anywhere in the world could immigrate and live without the fear of the government exterminating or expelling them.  Although Medinat Yisra’el is not a “Jewish State,” it has, with the ever-present help of HaShem, so far managed to be a “state for Jews.”
 
That Medinat Yisra’el is a “state for Jews,” begs the question, “Who is a Jew?”
 
The answer to this question is, of course, that a “Jew” is a person who, in accordance with Jewish religious law – Halakha – is Jewish.  Halakha, in turn, defines a “Jew” as a person who either: (1) was born to a mother who, in accordance with Halakha, is Jewish, or (2) converted to Judaism in accordance with the requirements of Halakha.
 
This definition then leads to the next question: “From what source does “Halakha” derive its validity, it authority?”  The answer to this question, of course, is the Torah, as interpreted by Jewish Sages and Poskim [פוסקים], Jewish legal scholars who decide issues of Halakha.
 
Being “Jewish” is inexorably connected with the Torah.  Contrary to what Professor Goldblum might believe, without Torah, there can be no Jews, no Jewish people, and, by extension, no Jewish State.
 
A brief review of Hebrew University history might help to put matters into perspective.  Twenty years ago, on July 31, 2002, an Arab terrorist detonated a bomb in the cafeteria of Hebrew University’s Mount Scopus campus.  Nine people were killed, including 5 American students; about 100 people were injured.
 
What people like Professor Goldblum refuse to accept is that the Arabs who live in Eretz Yisra’el sincerely, albeit erroneously, believe that Eretz Yisra’el belongs to them, not to the Jewish people.  No amount of Jewish attempts to integrate Arabs into Jewish society will change this fundamental fact.
 
What is “shameful” is not that Hebrew University is closed on Jewish religious days, but rather, that Jews such as Professor Goldblum still don’t understand and accept that unless, and until, Medinat Yisra’el becomes a Jewish State, a state which is governed exclusively by Jews, for the sole benefit of Jews, rather than a state for Jews that “bends over backwards” in an attempt to integrate Gentiles who seek its destruction, the purpose of Medinat Yisra’el – a state where Jews can live securely and in peace – will never be a reality.
 
Although Medinat Yisra’el is not yet a Jewish State, HaShem has decreed that, one day (in the not-too-distant future), it will be a Jewish State.  Currently, however, Medinat Yisra’el is simply a “state for Jews.”  In other words, the Medinat is a work-in-progress.  Nevertheless, there is no impropriety whatsoever in Hebrew University, or any other entity which is funded by tax revenues, being closed on Jewish religious days and open on the religious days of foreign cultures.
 
So, rather than just mourning the loss of the Beit HaMikdash (Temple in Jerusalem), all Jews who live outside of Eretz Yisra’el [חוץ לארץ] should seriously consider performing the timeless misva of Yishuv Eretz Yisra’el [ישוב ארץ ישראל], that is, making Aliyah (immigrating to, and living in, Eretz Yisra’el).  By increasing, through Aliyah (and natural growth), the number of Jewish citizens of the Medinat, it will be possible for Jews to defeat at the ballot box those who share the misguided ideas espoused by Professor Goldblum and thereby restore Jewish sovereignty by converting the Medinat from a "state for Jews" to a true "Jewish State."
 
Am Yisrael chai
עם ישראל חי