​On September 1, 2022, the Israel Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Amiram Ben Uliel, who was found guilty of the 2015 arson murders of a family of three.
 
There appears to be no serious factual dispute as to whether Ben Uliel did, in fact, commit the acts which constitute the charged offenses of murder.  Rather, the only legitimate issue on appeal was whether Ben Uliel’s confessions should have been excluded from evidence because they were compelled, through an illegal use of force by police, rather than voluntarily given by Ben Uliel.
 
In its opinion affirming Ben Uliel’s convictions, the Israel Supreme Court acknowledged that Ben Uliel remained silent during the first 17 days of his in-custody interrogations and that he “confessed” only after police employed “special [interrogation] measures.”  Failing to address the issue of whether evidence illegally obtained by police should be admissible at trial to prove a defendant’s guilt, the Israel Supreme Court wrote, “There is no doubt that it was he [Ben Uliel] who committed this terrible deed.”  Based on the Court’s statement, Israeli police might now reasonably conclude that confessions which are obtained through an illegal use of force are lawful, as long as the crime is sufficiently “terrible” and there is “no doubt” as to a defendant’s guilt.  How the police are to know, during a pre-trial investigation, that there is “no doubt” as to potential defendant’s guilt is a question the Court apparently left for another day.
 
The concern that the Court’s opinion might encourage future police misconduct was not lost on at least one member of the Court.  Judge Yosef Elron wrote, “I will admit that I remain troubled to a certain extent about the future, given the message sent to the investigative bodies in view of this outcome.”
 
The “Exclusionary Rule” is a rule of evidence which provides that illegally obtained evidence of a crime is generally inadmissible at trial to prove a defendant’s guilt.  Judge Benjamin Cardozo, a respected American jurist from the early 1900s, criticized the rule, stating that application of the rule allows, “[t]he criminal . . . to go free because the constable has blundered.”
 
Judge Cardozo, in his criticism of the rule, was exactly correct.  Applying the Exclusionary Rule will often – but not always – allow the guilty to go free.  It should never be forgotten, however, that government, vis-à-vis the individual, is the holder of extraordinary power and that civil liberties can be protected only through a meaningful restraint on the exercise of that power.
 
Thus, although application of the Exclusionary Rule may, on a small number of occasions, allow criminal defendants such as Ben Uliel to go free, the rule promotes the greater good by incentivizing government to refrain from committing the “terrible deed” of exercising its vast powers in an unlawful manner, powers which far exceed the capability of any criminal defendant to commit a “terrible deed.”
 
The Exclusionary Rule is commonly understood to have been adopted in American jurisprudence by the 1961 U.S. Supreme Court case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  However, general application of the rule in U.S. courts can be traced to at least 1886.  Zoo v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (applying the rule to the compelled production of business papers).  In the context of coerced confessions, use of the rule in U.S. courts can be traced to at least 1897.  Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
 
The history of the rule, however, goes back much further in time and place, to England, which of course is the source of America’s judicial system and early precedent.  Roe v. Harvey, 98 Eng. Rep. 302 (K.B. 1769).
 
Over the course of the centuries, the contours and breadth of the Exclusionary Rule have often been the subject of judicial dispute.  Nevertheless, British and American courts have consistently held that, at a minimum, the rule should always be construed broadly enough to encompass coerced confessions.
 
Israel, of course, is not England, nor is it the United States.  Nevertheless, Israel considers itself to be a “democracy” and, consistent with this characterization, has incorporated a large body of both British and American jurisprudence into its legal system.  Indeed, Israel’s parliamentary structure of government is modeled after the British “Westminster” system and the substance of many of Israel’s laws and legal procedures are derived from British and American sources.  Thus, it would be quite inconsistent for Israel to repudiate a legal principle which is as foundational and settled in the jurisprudence of Western democracies as is the Exclusionary Rule, especially as applied to coerced confessions.
 
In the opinion affirming his conviction, the Israel Supreme Court also said that Ben Uliel’s “actions contradict and conflict with all moral values and Jewish culture.”
 
If the Torah did not exist, G-d forbid, there could be no Jews and, by extension, no Jewish nation, no Jewish state, and, of course, no morals or Jewish culture.  Thus, it is not possible to analyze “moral values and Jewish culture,” let alone Jewish law, without reference to Torah.
 
Jewish law, that is, real Jewish law, as set forth in Halakha, provides that confessions are inadmissible – under all circumstances – to prove a defendant’s guilt.  Masekhet Sanhedrin 9b.  The rule which makes confessions inadmissible was likely derived, by inference, from the fact that nowhere in Tanakh or Talmud is there any provision for the interrogation of arrestees or criminal defendants.  It follows, of course, that if all confessions are inadmissible, there is little concern that government will torture defendants in an effort to obtain confessions.
 
The Jewish rule – the Halakha – which excludes all confessions, is consistent with other, related aspects of Jewish criminal procedure, as both the former and the latter are weighted in favor of the defendant.  In other words, the effect of the Exclusionary Rule, which Judge Cardozo criticized as allowing “[t]he criminal . . . to go free because the constable has blundered,” is a concept which the Torah fully supports and endorses.
 
The issue of whether coerced confessions should be admissible in criminal proceedings vividly illustrates the age-old dichotomy between the collective security of society and the personal liberties of individuals.  Where personal liberties are weighted too heavily, unregulated societal anarchy will follow.  Where the security of society is weighted too heavily, totalitarianism, a police state, will follow.  As history has shown, time and again, police states are much more common than are unregulated societal anarchies.
 
The State of Israel is less than 100 years old.  It was founded by socialists, based on socialist principles.  Socialist doctrine, in turn, rejects anything and everything, including HaShem and His Torah, which occupy a position which is more authoritative than the State.
 
In order to acquire and maintain power, socialist regimes the world over have relied – and continue to rely – on the empty and false promise of collective security.  The so-called “bargain” goes like this: “The government will provide security, if individuals will voluntarily relinquish their individual civil liberties.”
 
A judicial system which allows the use of coerced confessions is a judicial system which not only condones the use of such confessions, but is also a system which encourages government agents to obtain such confessions in the first place.  The well-earned name that history has assigned to such regimes, that is, regimes where the ends justify the means, is none other than: “Police State.”

Two important steps for preventing the creation of – or dismantling – a police state are:
(1) the adoption and use of an Exclusionary Rule and

​(2) the creation and implementation of a meaningful system of civil damage awards that hold both government agencies and individual government agents financially responsible for the commission of knowing and willful violations of civil rights.
​
Unfortunately, the 2007 assessment of Israel, made by the esteemed American jurist Richard A. Poser, is as valid today as it was then: “Israel is an immature democracy, poorly governed; its political class is mediocre and corrupt; it floats precariously in a lethally hostile Muslim sea; and it really could use a constitution.”  Richard A. Posner, “Enlightened Despot (reviewing Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (2006)),” New Republic, April 2007, at p.53.

​If there is an overriding theme that runs through Torah, it is that HaShem separated the Jewish people from the other peoples of the world; that He designated Eretz Yisra’el as the one and only homeland for this separate people to “dwell alone;” and that to secure the blessings that HaShem has promised, the Jewish people must obey His commands.  One of these commands is, of course, to Yishuv Eretz Yisra’el, that is, for Jews to make Aliyah (immigrate to Eretz Yisra’el) and settle the Land.
 
The important statistic, however, is not how many Jews make Aliyah each year, but rather, the net increase in the number of Jews who make Aliyah each year.  That is, the important statistic is the number of Jews who make Aliyah each year, reduced by the number of Jews who, after making Aliyah, leave Israel each year and return to their country of origin.
 
According to some reports, as many as 40% of Olim from the United States return to America within two years of making Aliyah, while 60% return within five years.  Although this statistic is, due to a lack of transparency by the Israeli government, difficult to confirm, it is an interesting statistic, especially in light of the fact that the Israeli government, on a monthly basis, provides new Olim with unearned cash (welfare) payments for the first five years after they immigrate, and that the monthly amount of those cash payments peak during year 2.
 
Through discussions with prospective Olim in the U.S., as well as Olim in Medinat Yisra’el (“the State of Israel” or, simply, the “Medinat”), several things become apparent.  First, many U.S. rabbinical leaders discourage Aliyah.  Second, notwithstanding U.S. rabbinical opposition to Aliyah, there are many religious Jews in the U.S. who make Aliyah, or who plan to make Aliyah.  Third, and most important to a discussion on maximizing the numbers of net Olim, is that the primary obstacle encountered by most Jews who are considering Aliyah is that of achieving and maintaining financial self-sufficiency post-Aliyah.
 
For the purpose of analyzing their financial situation, Olim can be classified as being either:
1. Medical or High-Tech professionals,
2. Persons with a foreign source of income (e.g., retirees, remote workers, etc.), or
3. Other (not falling in category 1 or 2).
 
Due to a market demand for employees, Olim who are medical or high-tech professionals appear likely to have the least difficulty integrating into the Israeli job market.  Persons with a foreign source of income are also less likely to experience significant post-Aliyah economic difficulties.
 
Although Olim in Categories 1 and 2 may leave the Medinat as a result of post-Aliyah financial difficulties, the subset of Category 3 Olim which consist of Olim who made Aliyah from a comparatively affluent (e.g., Western) country, appear to be the group of Olim who are most likely to return to their country of origin due to post-Aliyah financial hardship.  Thus, the Aliyah failure rate for Category 1 and Category 2 Olim might be lower than the 40% and 60% rates mentioned above, while the Aliyah failure rate for the subset of Category 3 Olim from Western countries may be significantly higher than the 40% and 60% rates mentioned above.
 
In order best assist all Olim in overcoming the challenge which is likely responsible for the highest rate of post-Aliyah departures to a Western country of origin, that is, to assist Olim in overcoming the challenge of achieving – and maintaining – economic self-sufficiency post-Aliyah, it is necessary to examine a little economic history.
 
The economies of the Medinat and the U.S. are practically mirror opposites.  The U.S. was officially founded almost 250 years ago, with the signing of the Declaration of Independence.  However, in the year 1620, more than 400 years ago, the Pilgrims, the predecessors of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, arrived in, and began settling portions of, what is now the United States of America.
 
The Pilgrims were a very religious group of Christians who analogized their voyage across the Atlantic Ocean to the Jews’ trek through the wilderness while en-route from Har Sinai to Eretz Yisra’el.  The Pilgrims also analogized their conquest of the “New World,” that is, to what would become the United States, to the Jews’ conquest of Eretz Yisra’el.  When the Pilgrims first sighted land from their ship, the Mayflower, they joined together in a communal recitation of Tehillim 100.
 
As an indication of how important Tanakh was to the founding generations of Americans, some early courses at Harvard University were taught in Hebrew and, as late as 1817, an annual speech was given in Hebrew at Harvard.

Tanakh also had an influence at Yale University.  Some early courses at Yale were taught in Hebrew and Yale’s coat of arms contained Hebrew letters which spelled the words “Urim and Thummim,” which the university translated as “Light and Truth.”
 
Being Christian students of Tanakh, the Pilgrims modeled the constitutions and laws of their “Promised Land,” of the original 13 Colonies or “states,” on Biblical principles.
 
Unfortunately, however, the Pilgrims’ understanding of Tanakh left quite a bit to be desired.  On July 1, 1620, the Pilgrims, prior to departing Plymouth, England, signed a seven-year contract in which they agreed to pool “all profits and benefits that are got by trade, traffic, trucking, working, fishing, or any other means of any person or persons. . . .”  The contract further provided “that at the end of the seven years, the capital and profits, viz. the houses, lands, goods and chattels, be equally divided. . . .”  In other words, the Pilgrims brought socialism to America.
 
However, instead of lasting seven years, the Pilgrims’ experiment with socialism failed after a mere two years.  Shortages and starvation abounded, and about fifty-percent of the colonists died of starvation and related illnesses.
 
Under the leadership of their Governor, William Bradford, the Pilgrims scuttled their socialist experiment and adopted a free-market economy.  The effects of a free-market economy were both immediate and dramatic.  When the Pilgrims were allowed to retain the fruits of their labor, productivity – and prosperity – increased almost overnight.
 
Since abandoning its extremely short, but disastrous, experiment with socialism in favor of the free-market, America – and its economy – has grown from a handful of fledgling colonies to become the greatest economy the world has ever known.  The only thing that is now harming America, the only thing which has ever harmed America, is its rejection and distancing of itself from Torah values.
 
Medinat Yisra’el, on the other hand, is not 400 years old; rather, it is a mere 74 years old.
 
The Medinat, unlike the United States, was founded by socialists, who implemented socialist policies.  A “guiding principle” of socialism is that nothing – including HaShem – can be more authoritative or powerful than the State.  One very important method that socialism employs to ensure that its monopoly on power is not threatened is the collective ownership of property, that is, the abrogation of the free-market and private property rights.
 
The Torah, however, rejects socialism.  This rejection can be seen as early as parashat Noah, with the story of the Tower of Babel, which is in Sefer Bereshit, right after the Flood.  One need not look too far from the Tower of Babel to see other Divine endorsements of the free-market and the private ownership of property.  The Ten Statements (“Commandments”) explicitly proscribe theft; a very large percentage of the 613 misvot deal, in one way or another, with free-market commercial transactions and property rights; and there are tractates of the Gemara which likewise focus on the private ownership of property and voluntary commerce.
 
The Medinat, like the United States, also suffered through a failure of socialism.
 
During the years 1978-1979, inflation in the Medinat, caused by government manipulation of the money supply, averaged 77 percent.  By 1984-1985, the annual rate of inflation peaked at a staggering 450 percent!  U.S. president Ronald Reagan offered the Medinat a $1.5 billion grant if the Medinat would abandon socialism and adopt free-market economic principles.  The Histadrut, the Medinat’s labor union, objected.  U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz responded with the threat that if the Medinat did not start implementing free-market economic policies, the United States would freeze all monetary transfers to the Medinat.  The threat worked and the Medinat, although being “dragged kicking and screaming,” started to implement the free-market “recommendations” that were made by the Reagan Administration.
 
As a part of its economic restructuring, the Medinat, on January 1, 1986, introduced, the New Israeli Shekel (NIS), which replaced the hyper-inflated Shekel at a rate of 1000:1.
 
Like the impact of free-market principles on the Pilgrims’ colony under William Bradford, the impact on the Israeli economy which resulted from the implementation of free-market principles was both immediate and dramatic.  Within one year, Israeli’s annual rate of inflation fell from an astounding 450% to 20%.
 
Unfortunately, however, the Medinat’s mid-1980s forced move away from some socialist policies is not the end of its story of economic failure.  Unlike America’s Pilgrims, Israel did not fully repudiate socialism.  Rather, many of Israel’s socialist policies persist to this day, causing an unnecessary and significant burden on the Medinat’s economy.  As the Pilgrims learned under the leadership of William Bradford, and as Israelis should have learned from the Medinat’s 1980s economic reform, socialism destroys an economy, while free-markets allow an economy to grow and flourish.  Accordingly, the Medinat could best assist Olim by implementing economic policies that will not only benefit Olim, but policies that will benefit all Israelis.  Those policies include:

1. Significantly lowering tax (personal, businesses, VAT/sales) rates.
2. Eliminating import and export taxes.
3. Eliminating wage and price controls.
4. Repealing labor and employment laws that hinder or otherwise interfere with at-will employment.
5. Repeal laws which create private-sector monopolies.
6. Privatize businesses which are currently operated by the government.
7. Repeal laws which disincentivize investment in Israeli businesses, including laws which discourage entrepreneurs from opening new businesses.

 
Admittedly, these recommended policies cannot, and even should not, be implemented “overnight.”  However, efforts should be made to strategically implement free-market economic policies over the long-term.  Such long-term implementation should also include a refusal to extend or expand current policies, or to adopt new policies, which are incompatible with a free-market.
 
Free-market reforms, such as those mentioned above, will work.  Other, “more-of-the-same” reforms, such as increased welfare payments to Olim, while perhaps well-intentioned, can only result in “more-of-the-same” failed results that are currently being experienced.
 
Medinat Yisra’el has tried the secular, socialist approach, which has failed.  The Jewish State should now try the Jewish approach, that is, HaShem’s approach, the approach which is set forth in His Holy Torah and which G-d Himself has promised will succeed, if only it is tried.  If the Medinat were to switch to the Torah approach for Jewish governance, not just with respect to economic policies, but as to all policies, the Medinat will have become the Light Unto the Nations that HaShem wants the Jewish people to be.

​The “judicial power” of government consists not only of the raw power, but the obligation – the duty – to decide cases which are brought by and between adverse litigants.  The judicial power, like any governmental or other power, is capable of – some might even say prone to – being abused.
 
At one end of the spectrum which constitutes abuse of judicial power is “judicial activism,” which manifests when a court makes a ruling which is based on personal opinion, rather than on an impartial and reasoned examination of the law, vis-à-vis the facts of a particular case.
 
The Israel Supreme Court is often – and not without good cause – accused of “judicial activism.”
 
At the other end of the abuse of judicial power spectrum is the abdication of judicial responsibility, that is, the failure to perform the judicial duty of deciding a case which is properly before the court.
 
In a case which runs counter to the Israel Supreme Court’s reputation for judicial activism, an Israel trial court recently dismissed a case because it was unable to locate any judicial precedent upon which to base its decision.
 
Although the case presented a social issue which might attract public attention – on both sides of the political spectrum – the case has continuing importance for all Israelis, not for the legal issue it raised, but rather, for the method of decision which was employed by the Israeli trial court to dispose of the case.
 
The case started simply enough when two females (“Plaintiffs”) responded to an advertisement that had been posted by a landlord who was seeking to rent an apartment in Bat Yam, Israel (“Defendant”).  Plaintiffs met Defendant at the apartment and, during the course of showing the apartment to Plaintiffs, Defendant allegedly asked Plaintiffs whether they, Plaintiffs, were “roommates or sisters.” During the ensuing conversation, Defendant concluded that Plaintiffs are lesbians and, on that basis, refused to rent the apartment to them.
 
Plaintiffs, relying on a law which makes it illegal to discriminate when selling certain products and services, filed suit against Defendant.
 
The trial judge, noting that the Israel Supreme Court is divided on the issue of whether residential rental units fall within the scope of the law cited by Plaintiffs, dismissed Plaintiffs’ case.
 
The task of a trial court is to hear cases which are brought to it by proper litigants, to ascertain the facts, and to render a decision based on a reasoned and impartial application of the law to the facts.
 
Here, it was undisputed that Plaintiffs and Defendant were proper litigants.  Plaintiffs alleged Defendant discriminated against Plaintiffs in violation of a specific law.
 
Defendant did not claim that Defendant did not discriminate against Plaintiffs.  Rather, Defendant alleged that the law cited by Plaintiffs did not apply to the facts of the case.  Specifically, Defendant argued that the law cited by Plaintiffs does not make housing discrimination based on sexual orientation illegal.
 
In cases where an appellate court has ruled on the legal issue which is before the trial court, the trial court has a duty – and indeed obligation – to follow appellate court precedent.  Thus, if the Israel Supreme Court had previously ruled on the issue of whether the scope of the anti-discrimination law cited by Plaintiffs is broad enough to encompass housing discrimination, the Bat Yam trial court would be obliged to rule in accordance with that appellate court decision.
 
However, the absence of appellate court precedent does not absolve a trial court of its duty to decide a case on the merits.  If things were otherwise, there would be little need for trial courts.  In cases such as the Bat Yam housing discrimination case, a trial court’s duty, in addition to ascertaining the facts of a case, is to examine the law and decide the legal issue(s) raised by the parties.
 
Thus, in the Bat Yam case, the trial court had a duty to take into consideration the facts of the case, as established by the evidence; examine not only the text of the anti-discrimination law cited by Plaintiffs, but also the purpose of the law and the context in which it was passed, including any legislative history which might be available; and then render a decision on the merits of the case.
 
Dismissing a case because there is an absence of applicable appellate court precedent is nothing short of a complete abdication by the trial court of its judicial duty to decide the case.
 
If a country is to be governed by the Rule of Law, proper litigants with a legitimate legal dispute, such as Plaintiffs and Defendants in the Bat Yam housing discrimination case, have a right to a trial court decision on the merits.
 
If the Bat Yam trial court had rendered a decision on the merits, that is, if the Bat Yam court had entered a judgment either (1) in favor of Plaintiffs, stating that the anti-discrimination statute applies to housing discrimination cases, or (2) in favor of Defendant, stating that the statute does not apply to housing discrimination cases, an appellate court would then be afforded the opportunity to decide this previously undecided legal issue.  The resulting appellate decision would then be available to guide tenants and landlords, as well as to assist future Knessets (Israeli legislatures) in making or amending laws.
 
It simply is not possible for a society whose courts engage in either judicial activism or judicial abdication to long be a free society which is governed by the Rule of Law, rather than by the whim of those who hold government power.
 
If the State of Israel (Medinat Yisra’el) desires to be the Light Unto the Nations that HaShem intends it to be, it will need to undertake a long and hard road of judicial (and other governmental) reforms.  May HaShem bless the Medinat to begin implementing such reforms without further delay.

​Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, recently announced that it would be closed on the Jewish holiday of Tisha B’Av.  Translated from Hebrew into English, “Tisha B’Av” means, simply, the “9th day of [the Jewish month of] Av.”
 
Hebrew University professor Amiram Goldblum reportedly opposed the closure, writing: “Unbelievable – a shameful submission to the religious and to the Jewish religion in the State of Israel.  Sickening.” and

Arutz Sheva (August 1, 2022).
 
Tisha B’Av, a day on which religious Jews mourn, fast, and recite special prayers, commemorates the destruction in Jerusalem of the First Temple, by the Babylonians (423 BCE), and Second Temple, by the Romans (69 CE), as well as many other tragedies which have befallen the Jewish history on, “coincidentally,” the 9th day of Av., including, for example:

1. The Biblical story of the Israelite “spies,” who, prior to the Israelites’ crossing of the Jordan river and invasion of Eretz Yisra’el (the “Land of Israel” or “the Land”), reconnitored and returned with a negative report of the Land.  Parashat Shelah, Bamidbar 13:1, et seq.
2. The Roman defeat of Bar Kokhba in the Battle of Betar (133 CE).
3. The Romans plow over the Temple Mount (134 CE).
4. The Jews of England were expelled from that country (1290 CE).
5. The Jews of Spain were expelled from that country (1492 CE).
6. Germany declared war on Russia, effectively starting World War I (1914 CE), which, in turn, led to World War II and the Holocaust.

The common theme which runs through all of these tragedies is the loss or dimunition of Jewish sovereignty.  Jewish sovereignty was lost with the destruction of the First and Second Temples, the potential for Jewish sovereignty was lost or diminished when (1) the “spies,” through their negative report, attempted to dissuade the Israelites from invading Eretz Yisra’el; (2) the Romans defeated Bar Kokhba, in the Battle of Betar and, one year later, plowed over the Temple Mount; (3) the Jewish populations of England and Spain were expelled from those countries; and (4) Jewish emigration from Europe was prohibited, which resulted in six million Jews were exterminated during the Holocaust.
 
Thus, we see that the theme of Tisha B’Av is Jewish sovereignty or, more accurately, mourning the loss of, or potential for, Jewish sovereignty.
 
The modern-day State of Israel (“Medinat Yisra’el”), notwithstanding the State’s self-proclaimed assertion to the contrary, is not a “Jewish State.”  If it were, Medinat Yisra’el would be governed exclusively by Jews, for the sole benefit of Jews (which it currently is not), and by Torah law (which it also currently is not), rather than by the potpourri of laws which the State has adopted from a variety of foreign, non-Jewish, sources.
 
However, although Medinat Yisra’el is not a Jewish State, it has taken some steps in the right direction, one of which is to declare Jewish holy days – including Tisha B’Av – to be national holidays.
 
Professor Goldblum reportedly lamented that he doesn’t “recall [Hebrew] university ever closing for Muslim or Christian festivals."  That, however, is how it should be.  Although Medinat Yisra’el is not a “Jewish State,” it is a “state for Jews.”
 
Medinat Yisra’el was founded, out of the ashes of the Holocaust, as a state for Jews, a country to which Jews from anywhere in the world could immigrate and live without the fear of the government exterminating or expelling them.  Although Medinat Yisra’el is not a “Jewish State,” it has, with the ever-present help of HaShem, so far managed to be a “state for Jews.”
 
That Medinat Yisra’el is a “state for Jews,” begs the question, “Who is a Jew?”
 
The answer to this question is, of course, that a “Jew” is a person who, in accordance with Jewish religious law – Halakha – is Jewish.  Halakha, in turn, defines a “Jew” as a person who either: (1) was born to a mother who, in accordance with Halakha, is Jewish, or (2) converted to Judaism in accordance with the requirements of Halakha.
 
This definition then leads to the next question: “From what source does “Halakha” derive its validity, it authority?”  The answer to this question, of course, is the Torah, as interpreted by Jewish Sages and Poskim [פוסקים], Jewish legal scholars who decide issues of Halakha.
 
Being “Jewish” is inexorably connected with the Torah.  Contrary to what Professor Goldblum might believe, without Torah, there can be no Jews, no Jewish people, and, by extension, no Jewish State.
 
A brief review of Hebrew University history might help to put matters into perspective.  Twenty years ago, on July 31, 2002, an Arab terrorist detonated a bomb in the cafeteria of Hebrew University’s Mount Scopus campus.  Nine people were killed, including 5 American students; about 100 people were injured.
 
What people like Professor Goldblum refuse to accept is that the Arabs who live in Eretz Yisra’el sincerely, albeit erroneously, believe that Eretz Yisra’el belongs to them, not to the Jewish people.  No amount of Jewish attempts to integrate Arabs into Jewish society will change this fundamental fact.
 
What is “shameful” is not that Hebrew University is closed on Jewish religious days, but rather, that Jews such as Professor Goldblum still don’t understand and accept that unless, and until, Medinat Yisra’el becomes a Jewish State, a state which is governed exclusively by Jews, for the sole benefit of Jews, rather than a state for Jews that “bends over backwards” in an attempt to integrate Gentiles who seek its destruction, the purpose of Medinat Yisra’el – a state where Jews can live securely and in peace – will never be a reality.
 
Although Medinat Yisra’el is not yet a Jewish State, HaShem has decreed that, one day (in the not-too-distant future), it will be a Jewish State.  Currently, however, Medinat Yisra’el is simply a “state for Jews.”  In other words, the Medinat is a work-in-progress.  Nevertheless, there is no impropriety whatsoever in Hebrew University, or any other entity which is funded by tax revenues, being closed on Jewish religious days and open on the religious days of foreign cultures.
 
So, rather than just mourning the loss of the Beit HaMikdash (Temple in Jerusalem), all Jews who live outside of Eretz Yisra’el [חוץ לארץ] should seriously consider performing the timeless misva of Yishuv Eretz Yisra’el [ישוב ארץ ישראל], that is, making Aliyah (immigrating to, and living in, Eretz Yisra’el).  By increasing, through Aliyah (and natural growth), the number of Jewish citizens of the Medinat, it will be possible for Jews to defeat at the ballot box those who share the misguided ideas espoused by Professor Goldblum and thereby restore Jewish sovereignty by converting the Medinat from a "state for Jews" to a true "Jewish State."
 
Am Yisrael chai
עם ישראל חי

​In an Orwellian attempt to deny that HaShem gave Eretz Yisra’el, including Har HaBayit (the Temple Mount), to the Jewish people and the Jewish nation, the State of Israel, a self-proclaimed democracy, has long enforced a law which makes it illegal for a Jew to pray on Har HaBayit, while at the same time, encouraging Muslim prayer at that location.
 
During the week of 15 Iyyar 5782 (May 22, 2022), three Jewish teenage boys were arrested by Israeli police for saying the “Shema” prayer and “bowing” while on Har  HaBayit.  Notwithstanding a 5777 (2016) Israeli Supreme Court ruling which held that police lack the authority to unilaterally issue restraining orders, the police in this case issued and served the teens with a restraining order which purported to bar them from the Old City, and by implication, from Har HaBayit, for a period of 15-days.
 
The Israeli police attempted to justify issuance of the restraining order by claiming that the conduct of the boys – reciting the Shema prayer and bowing – may lead to a violation of public order.  In other words, Israeli police claimed that Jewish prayer combined with “bowing” may provoke local Muslims to commit illegal acts of violence.
 
The statement by a police commissioner that engaging in public prayer constitutes a criminal act because such prayer may incite others to commit illegal acts of violence is, in a word, outrageous.  Any police commissioner who would make such a claim, rather than order his subordinate officers to protect worshipers from the threat of illegal and violent acts by others, has irreparably violated the public trust and should immediately be dismissed from the police force.  Furthermore, it should be no defense that the police commissioner was only acting in accordance with instructions from his superiors, regardless of whether those superiors are politicians or higher-ranking civil servants.
 
On 22 Iyyar 5782 (Sunday, May 22, 2022), a Jerusalem appellate court, in ruling that police exceeded their authority when they issued a restraining order against the teenage boys, stated “[i]t is difficult to imagine a situation in which shouting ‘Shema Yisrael’ on the Temple Mount would [unlawfully] lead to a breach of the peace.”  The court went on to quote Israeli Police Commissioner Kobi Shabtai, who said during the recent, month-long, Muslim holiday of Ramadan that “[t]he Temple Mount is open. The Israel Police allows [sic] all residents of the country and the territories who come to pray on the Temple Mount to ascend and observe the worship of religion [sic].”  The police commissioner, however, apparently did not intend for his invitation to pray on Har HaBayit to include Jews.
 
To state what should be obvious, there is something fundamentally wrong when a Jewish state enacts or enforces a law which makes it illegal for a Jew to pray.
 
Further compounding this injustice is the apparent disregard by police of a prior Israeli Supreme Court ruling which held that it is unlawful for police to unilaterally issue restraining orders.
 
In a democratic society, which the State of Israel claims to be, a fundamental principle of law is that the proper role of the police is to enforce the law, not make it.  When police claim the power to unilaterally issue restraining orders, they deprive the person(s) against whom such orders issue of due process of law, which in this context means the right to a fair hearing before an impartial judge, prior to the imposition of a restraint on their freedom of movement.
 
Police officers have an implicit obligation to be aware, and know the substance, of court rulings that delineate the boundaries of their authority.  When they exceed their authority, they should be held accountable, both through administrative disciplinary procedures within the police department, as well as through criminal prosecution and/or private civil damage awards against the government and/or against individual police officers.

​Israeli media reported that on 14 Adar II 5782 (Thursday, March 17, 2022), two dolls portraying Israeli police officers were hanged in effigy in the Beit Shemesh neighborhood of Jerusalem and that in a separate protest, a picture of the mayor of Jerusalem was “hanged” in the Jerusalem neighborhood of Mea Shearim.
 
Israeli police disbursed the protesters and made several arrests.
 
Although it was reported that the Mea Shearim protest was in opposition to the proposed installation of a new light rail train line through that neighborhood, the Israeli media, as is typical in more controversial matters, was diligent in failing to report the motivation for, or purpose of, the Beit Shemesh protest.
 
Politically-motivated protests are, of course, common, not only in Israel, but in other countries as well.
 
The State of Israel, however, unlike countries that recognize and accept that free speech is not a right which is granted by government but, rather, is a fundamental human right which exists notwithstanding government, has a long and sordid history of infringing that right.
 
For example, the State of Israel has banned certain candidates/parties from seeking election to the Knesset (Parliament), on the ground that their political platform is such that it constitutes an “incitement to racism.”  Although most would agree that “racism” is unacceptable, the fact remains that, as the saying goes, “the devil is in the details.”  In other words, the definition of “racism” is often fluid, and is defined only as being that position which is held by one’s political opponents.
 
Indeed, many who oppose the Torah do so, at least in part, by claiming – falsely – that many provisions of the Torah are “racist.”
 
Compounding the nefarious nature of a law which makes “incitement to racism” a ground for disqualifying one’s political opponents from running for office is that the law is comingled with other provisions of law which – legitimately – prohibit those who seek the overthrow of the government from running for political office.

Section 7A of Basic Law: The Knesset
 
In the aftermath of another protest, this one having occurred in Beit Shemesh on 30 Kislev 5772 (December 26, 2011), Member of the Knesset (MK) Nachman Shai reportedly submitted to the Knesset a bill that would make “publicizing, inciting, preaching or encouraging gender segregation in the public sphere” a criminal act punishable by three years in prison.”  In other words, MK Shai did not seek to criminalize harmful conduct; he sought to criminalize speech.
 
The Talmud famously records an incident regarding Rabbi Eliezer and a debate about whether a vessel called the “Oven of Aknai” could become ritually unclean:

​T.B., Masekhet Bava Metzia 59b.
 
Thus, as we see, Jewish Law (Halakha), as should the State of Israel, protects the right of free speech and dissent.  Not only was it permissible for Rabbi Eliezer to take a position which was counter to that of the Rabbis; it was also permissible for the Rabbis, in turn, to take a position which challenged The Holy One, Blessed be He.
 
Thus, if it is permissible for Rabbi Eliezar to challenge the Rabbis, and for the Rabbis, in turn, to challenge the Almighty, surely it is appropriate for the Jewish people to challenge the workings of its secular government in the State of Israel.
 
In its Declaration of Independence, signed on 6th Iyar 5708 (May 15, 1948), the State of Israel declared that it would adopt a constitution no later than October 1, 1948.  However, as often happens, reality got in the way of good intentions and, due in part to having to fight a war of independence, no constitution was adopted, either by May 15, 1948, or at anytime thereafter.  Instead, a document known as the Harari Proposal, was adopted by the Knesset.  The Harari Proposal provides for the adoption of so-called “Basic Laws” which, although not a constitution in any real sense, are nevertheless labeled as such under Israeli law.
 
Israel’s Basic Laws, although having created a façade of democracy and respect for civil rights (including free speech), have failed to secure for the Jewish people a true system of democracy and freedom.  As the distinguished and highly-respected Richard Posner, an American-born Jew whose parents immigrated to the United State from Eastern Europe, and who is also a U.S. appellate judge, once wrote, “Israel is an immature democracy, poorly governed; its political class is mediocre and corrupt; it floats precariously in a lethally hostile Muslim sea; and it really could use a constitution.”  Richard Posner, Enlightened Despot (April 22, 2007).
 
Judge Posner is, of course, correct.  The State of Israel “could use a constitution.”  And as the saying goes, “there is no time like the present” for Israel to convene a constitutional convention – which should be wholly independent from the current system of government – for that purpose.
 
As a 20th century Jewish economist once said, “Liberty is meaningless if it is only the liberty to agree with those in power.”  Ludwig von Mises.

​Michael B. Oren, author, former Israeli ambassador to the United States, and former member of the Knesset, recently wrote an article titled “Israel needs Olim.”  In his article, Dr. Oren reveals that, on the heels of a 31% increase in Aliyah from North America during 2021, some members of the Israeli government want to discourage, or at a minimum, not promote, Aliyah (Jewish immigration to Eretz Yisra’el).  Dr. Oren, who supports Jews making Aliyah, relates these objections as including:

1. “Why should we subsidize people who are better off than we are?”

2. “Why should we welcome people who going to take our jobs and increase the already sky-high price of housing?”

3. Israel [is] already too crowded, they argue, with the highest natural growth rate in the industrialized world.  “The last thing we need is a larger population.”

Let us analyze each of these objections to Aliyah:

As Dr. Oren points out, a significant percentage of Jews who make Aliyah do so, at least in part, to flee anti-Semitism which exists in their country of birth or current residence.

Medinat Yisra’el (the State of Israel), the only Jewish state in the world, arose from the ashes of Auschwitz.  For a Jewish member of the Israeli government to ask, “Why should Israel subsidize Jewish immigrants who are “better off” than Israelis” begs the question: “How can a Jew who is coming home to the Land of his forefathers, Avraham, Yizhaq, and Ya’aqov, be “better off” before making Aliyah than are his Jewish-Israeli brethren who already reside in the Land, especially if the immigrating Jew is fleeing to Israel to escape anti-Semitism in his country of birth or current residence?

However, those who complain about “Israel subsidizing Jewish immigrants who are ‘better off’ than Israelis” are probably not referring to anti-Semitism, but rather to economic considerations.

If we understand the term “better off” to mean having a greater financial net worth, the allegation that Olim (Jewish immigrants to Israel) are financially “better off” than native-born Israelis may be true in some cases and may not be true in other cases.  That assessment, however, not only misses the real issue, it obfuscates it through what is little more than a Socialist class-warfare argument.

To say that a person should not be allowed to immigrate to a country because the immigrant is “better off” financially than a majority of the country’s current citizens is much more an indictment of the country’s economic policies than it is of the intended immigrant.  Assuming the truth of the allegation, the questions the country should be asking include: “Why are the citizens of our country financially poorer than people who want to immigrate to our country?” and “What economic policies can we change that would make it easier for our citizens to be more economically successful?”

Lastly, if a country is going to base its immigration policy on an intended immigrant’s net worth, it would make a lot more sense for the country to encourage immigration by wealth, rather than economically disadvantaged, individuals.  After all, wealthy immigrants are more likely than other immigrants to start businesses and spend money in their new country, and less likely than their less affluent fellow immigrants to need government financial assistance after immigrating.

As for providing direct subsidies to Olim, perhaps such subsidies would not be necessary, and perhaps the county’s current citizens would not be as economically disadvantaged as they are, if the State of Israel would lower its income tax rates (33% on the equivalent of about $68,500 of income; 45% on the equivalent of about $150,000 or more of income), lower its value-added tax (VAT) rate of 17%, and lower its real property tax rates.

Israel’s Basic Laws (quasi-constitutional provisions) proclaim that Medinat Yisra’el is a “Jewish state.”  When Medinat Yisra’el came into existence in 1948, shortly after the Shoah (Holocaust), one of the foundational ideas upon which the country was established was that any Jew, from anywhere in the world, was welcome — and indeed encouraged — to make Aliyah; that is, to immigrate to Israel.  This foundational idea was given concrete meaning through the enactment of Israel’s Law of Return, which remains the law of the Holy Land to this day.

To restrict, or discourage, Aliyah out of fear that Olim “will take Israeli jobs” would constitute a violation of both Israel’s Basic Law which, declares that Israel is a “Jewish State,” and Israel’s Law of Return.

Furthermore, to argue that Jewish immigration to Israel will result in a loss of Israeli jobs is really nothing more than a veiled argument which states that Israel is already at, or that it already exceeds, its optimum population point.  The fear is not so much a growth in population through immigration, but, rather, a fear of any population growth, as any growth in population has the potential to impact the Israeli labor market.  Thus, in order to be consistent, those who advocate against Jewish immigration to the Jewish homeland, would also have to advocate for population control devices such as compulsory birth control, as an increase in population through natural growth, all other things being equal, will also result in a loss of Israeli jobs, albeit over a longer period of time.

Extreme methods such as refusing to allow Jews to immigrate to Israel and other population control devices are not necessary to ensure that Medinat Yisra’el has a growing and vibrant economy and labor market.  Consider the following proposals:

1. Eliminate import taxes. 
The State of Israel imposes taxes on the import of most items, which, in turn cripples, or at least severely restricts the ability of businesses to import and sell both consumer goods and factors of production at affordable prices.  If import taxes were eliminated, more Olim, as well as foreign businesses and Israeli entrepreneurs, would be willing and able to start businesses in Israel.

2. Reform labor laws.
The State of Israel, having been founded by Socialists, continues to be plagued to this day by labor laws which restrict a free market in labor services.  A good start at labor law reform would be to:

a. Dissolve all labor unions;

b. Pass a law which states that unless an employer and employee voluntarily enter into a contract which states otherwise, all employment relationship are at “at-will,” meaning that either party can terminate the employment relationship at-will, without penalty; and

c. Repeal all laws which mandate the form or amount of compensation that an employer must pay and employee.

If implemented, these labor law reforms would, on an annual basis, create many more private-sector jobs than there are new Olim.

3. Reform government employment practices.
According to its Basic Law, the State of Israel is officially a “Jewish State.”  Thus, a law should be passed which states that one qualification for government employment is that an applicant/employee must be Jewish.  Such a law would apply to all government employees.  Such a law, if implemented, would not merely offset the effects of Jewish immigration, it would also bring the State of Israel into compliance with Jewish religious law (Halakha) on this issue.

It’s true that the larger cities in Medinat Yisra’el, like the larger cities in most other nations, have some degree of congestion.  However, even for a comparatively small country, there are vast amounts of undeveloped land in Israel.  The following are just a few laws which, if implemented, would result in more than ample land being available for Olim and other Jews:

1. Reform government land ownership law.
In keeping with its Socialist roots, an estimated 93% of the real property which constitutes the State of Israel, excluding Samaria, Judea, and Gaza, is owned by the Israeli government.  A reform of the Basic Law, which currently provides “The ownership of Israel lands, being the lands in Israel of the State, the Development Authority or the Keren Kayemet Le-Israel, shall not be transferred either by sale or in any other manner” should be repealed.  In its place, a new Basic Law should be enacted which states, in essence, that all Israeli lands are to be privately owned, except for those lands that the government purchases or acquires through a law of eminent domain for a legitimate government use.

2. Reform general land ownership law. 
Enact a Basic Law which states that only Jews shall have the legal right to purchase real property, and that no rental of real property to non-Jews shall exceed a term of 1 year in duration.

3. Sovereignty over Jewish lands. 
Bring all lands within the borders of the State of Israel under the control and sovereignty of the State, including the entirety of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

These proposed reforms to Israeli real property law, if enacted, would ensure that there would be no shortage of land for Olim and an increasing Jewish population, which, in turn, means that, all other things being equal, Jewish immigration to Israel would not negatively impact the cost of housing.  Additionally, implementing these proposed laws would have the benefit of bringing Israeli law more in line with Halakha.

​Not only would these proposed reforms, if implemented, more than offset any adverse impact on the Israeli economy that might be attributed to Jews who make Aliyah, these reforms would greatly benefit the Israeli economy by a factor which is beyond what many currently believe is even possible.  Furthermore, implementing these reforms would result in the State of Israel changing course, from one which is going away from Torah, to one which is directly aligned with Israel’s true constitution: The Torah.

During July 2021, the Israeli Religious Affairs Minister announced proposed reforms to the Israeli system of kashrut (kosher) certification, the stated purpose of which is to lower the costs of kashrut certification which, in turn, is intended to lower the cost to consumers of kosher food.  The proposed reforms are strenuously opposed by the Chief Rabbinate, which currently is the beneficiary of a monopoly — created by Israeli law — over such certifications.

The Chief Rabbinate is a government agency within the Ministry of Religious Services and, under current law, the Chief Rabbinate exercises certain legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

The Chief Rabbinate consists of two Chief Rabbis: an Ashkenazi rabbi, and a Sephardi rabbi (aka: Rishon leZion).  The Chief Rabbis serve for a term of 10 years.  Currently, the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi is David Lau and the Sephardic Chief Rabbi is Yitzhak Yosef, both of whom began their terms in 2013.

In addition to the monopoly over kashrut certifications, the Chief Rabbinate also operates Israel’s religious courts, which exercise exclusive jurisdiction over Jewish marriages, Jewish divorces, conversions to Judaism, and Jewish burials.  Israel’s religious courts also share concurrent jurisdiction with secular Israeli courts over matters such as personal status, alimony, child support, child custody, and inheritance.  Court orders issued by Israel’s religious courts are enforced in the same manner as court orders issued by Israel’s secular courts.

Under the proposed reforms to the system of kashrut certification, the Chief Rabbinate, rather than directly providing kashrut certifications to businesses (manufacturers, restaurants, etc.), would set national standards and regulate private entities which, in turn, would provide kosher certifications.  Most importantly, the proposed reforms would allow private kashrut certification providers to certify the kashrut of an item even though the item does not comply with the Chief Rabbinate’s standards, provided that three municipal rabbis consent to the certification.

The response of the Chief Rabbinate was that:

​
Although the Chief Rabbinate opposes the proposed kashrut certification reform, it has been reported that David Lau, whose term as Chief Rabbi is scheduled to end in approximately 2 years, has agreed to not oppose kashrut certification reform in exchange for an appointment to the Supreme Rabbinical Court.  Perhaps this deal fell through, as it was reported about a month later that Chief Rabbis Lau and Yitzhak Yosef led a protest against the kashrut reforms.

During early December 2021, it was reported that, according to Israel’s state security agency, the life of Religious Affairs Minister had been threatened, in part because of the Minister’s legislative efforts to enact kashrut certification reforms.

At the core of this controversy is whether government should have a monopoly on kashrut certification.  The Chief Rabbinate and its supporters claim that kashrut certification reform — a partial divestment of the Rabbinate’s monopoly on kashrut certification — will result in “the end of proper Kashrut supervision.”

However, the Rabbinate also claims that if kashrut reforms are enacted, consumers will reject private kashrut certifications and “vote with their feet” to reject such certifications.  If so, the Rabbinate has nothing to fear, except perhaps for a loss of a significant amount of revenue from businesses who purchase the Rabbinate’s certifications.

The real question is not whether the Chief Rabbinate should be partially divested of its monopoly to issue kashrut certifications by limiting its role to setting national kashrut standards, but rather, whether there is any justification whatsoever for government involvement in setting or enforcing kashrut standards.

First, kashrut certification is an issue only for Jews who voluntarily choose to “keep kosher.”  If a Jew decides to not “keep kosher,” he simply buys and eats whatever pleases him.  For this Jew, kashrut certifications are meaningless.

Second, for the Jew who does “keep kosher,” there is no reason to believe that he cannot, or will not, take the time and trouble to learn about various private kashrut certifications and choose the certification(s) that best suits him.  For this Jew, his decision affect only him and no one else.

Third, the Rabbinate claims that, if kashrut reforms are enacted, Israeli Jews will “vote with their feet” to reject private kashrut certification.  However, it appears more likely that the Rabbinate is afraid that if allowed to do so, the masses will in fact “vote with their feet,” and reject the Rabbinate.

In the final analysis, the problem is not limited to Israeli kasrut standards, or even to the proper role of the Rabbinate.  The root of the problem, notwithstanding Israel’s Basic Laws, is an Israeli government that is neither Jewish nor democratic.

​Shortly after the beginning of every (Jewish) new year, the Torah portion Hayye Sara, which tells the story of the purchase by Abraham Abinu of the Cave of Makhpela, which is located in Hebron, Israel, is read on Shabbat in synagogues throughout the world.  Not surprisingly, many Jews who live in Israel, or who just happen to be in Israel, visit Hebron and the Cave of Makhpela during the week which immediately precedes the Shabbat on which Hayye Sara is read in synagogues.

This year, 5782 (2021), in order to gain access to the Cave of Makhpela, visitors are being required to disclose private medical information which either proves they have been fully “vaccinated” against the Coronavirus or that they have recovered from the virus.

Visitors to the Cave of Makhpela who do not possess the required proof of “vaccination” or who decline to disclose to government officials who control access to the Cave of Makhpela information contained in their private medical records, are denied access to the Cave of Makhpela.  Instead of being allowed to enter and pray inside of the Cave, these visitors are treated as virtual lepers, as persons who are to be shunned and excluded from society.  Although not allowed inside of the Cave, these “lepers” are allowed to pray outside, near a staircase entrance which is no longer in use and which has been walled-off from the interior of the Cave.

Prior to September 1, 2021, the definition of a vaccine was: “A product that stimulates a person’s immune system to produce immunity to a specific disease, protecting the person from that disease.”  (https://web.archive.org/web/20210826113846).  The term “immunity,” in turn, was defined as “protection from an infectious disease,” (Id.), meaning that “If you are immune to a disease, you can be exposed to it without becoming infected.

Since September 1, 2021, the CDC’s definition of a “vaccine” is a “preparation that is used to stimulate the body’s immune response against diseases.”

Why the change in the definition of a “vaccine”?  The reason must be that the COVID injections that are touted as “vaccines” do not provide immunity from the Coronavirus.  In fact, Dr. David E. Martin has explained that the COVID injections have been described as “gene therapy technology” and that notwithstanding that both the Moderna and Pfizer mRNA shots are labeled as “vaccines,” the actual patents for the Pfizer and Moderna injections describes them as “gene therapy,” not vaccines.

Dr. Joseph Mercola has written that the COVID “vaccines” “do not actually impart immunity or inhibit transmissibility of the [Coronavirus] disease.  In other words, [the COVID “vaccines”] are not designed to keep you from getting sick with SARS-CoV-2; they only are supposed to lessen your infection symptoms if or when you do get infected.

Pfizer, which has an exclusive contract with the Israeli government to provide COVID “vaccine” to that country’s government-controlled, mandatory healthcare system has admitted that it is using Israel as a “laboratory” to test its COVID “vaccine.”  Interestingly, there have been a significant number of cases where Israelis who have been injected with the COVID “vaccine” experienced heart problems, up to and including death, after having been injected with the COVID “vaccine.”

If, as medical professionals have stated, the COVID “vaccines” are designed to merely “stimulate the body’s immune response against diseases,” rather than prevent infection or transmission of the disease, any law that restricts a person’s freedom of movement or, as in the case of access to the Cave of Makhpela, restrict a person’s freedom of religion, cannot be tolerated.

Returning to the walled-off staircase where persons who are not allowed entry to the Cave of Makhpela because they do not possess proof that they have taken an experimental “vaccine,” we find that there is precedent, indeed centuries of precedent, for excluding individuals from the Cave.

For a period of approximately 700 years, a period which lasted until the end of the Six Day War in 1967, Muslims, who controlled Cave of Makhpela did not allow Jews to enter the Cave.  Instead, Jews were allowed access only to the seventh step of the staircase at the entrance which has now been walled-off.

Today, instead of Muslims denying Jews access to the Cave of Makhpela, the government of the Jewish State of Israel is denying Jews access to the Cave because these particular Jews have declined to take an experimental, and potentially harmful, drug, or to disclose their medical history relating to whether they have been injected with an experimental drug.

By: HaRav Menashe Sasson
Reporting from Jerusalem, Israel
​Published in the U.S.A.

Earlier this year, 5781 (2021), Gazan Arabs used a property-rights dispute in the Shimon HaTzaddik (Sheikh Jarrah) neighborhool of (east) Yerushalayim as a pretext to initiate a battle in the ongoing war that Gazan-Arabs have been waging, and which they continue to wage, against Israel.  For 15 days in during May, Gazan-Arabs fired rockets and launched incindary balloons from Gaza into the Israeli-controlled areas of Israel.  The Israeli military (IDF) responded with air strikes, but did not use ground troops to invade Gaza.

This pretextual property-rights dispute centers around homes in the Shimon HaTzaddik neighborhood of Yerushalayim which were Jewish-owned prior to the 1948 war of independence (1948 war).  Jordan captured the Shimon HaTzaddik neighborhood during the 1948 war and then gave the homes to Arabs.

During the Six-Day war in 1967, Israel recaptured the Shimon HaTzaddik neighborhood and restored ownership of the Shimon HaTzaddik homes to their rightful Jewish owners.  The Israeli government then exceeded its legitimate authority by making an agreement with the Arab residents of Shimon HaTzaddik  which would allow them to remain in their former homes if they paid rent to the Jewish owners of the homes.

The Arabs, however, have never paid any rent.  The Jewish owners responded by doing the only thing that they could under the circumstances: they instituted eviction proceedings in an attempt to regain possession of their homes.

In an apparant last-ditch effort to avoid what should be an easy decision for any court to make, the Arabs residents of Shimon HaTzaddik are seeking to introduce “newly discovered” Jordanian documents which, the Arabs claim, will provide additional support for their claim for possession of the homes.

The legal insufficiency that the Shimon HaTzaddik Arabs seem to have overlooked, or, more likely, which they would like the court to overlook, is that Israel recaptured and liberated the Shimon HaTzaddik neighborhood of Yerushalayim during the 1967 war, an act which legally extinguished any and all Jordanian sovereignty – which specifically includes, but which is not limited to, land deeds – over real property located in Shimon HaTzaddik.

Thus, any Jordanian documents which predate Israel’s 1967 military victory and liberation of the Shimon HaTzaddik neighborhood are irrelevant to the resolution of this property dispute.

​Despite clear and overwhelming evidence that the Jewish owners of the Shimon HaTzaddik properties are legally entitiled to orders of eviction, it appears that the Israel Supreme Court, rather than simply performing its judicial duty, is, likely for political rather than judicial reasons, attempting to force a settlement.